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Abstract 
I analyze the costs and benefits of accounting conservatism for debtholders by examining 
its effect on bond pricing. Contractual benefits of conservatism arise because it accelerates 
the triggering of tripwires built into earnings covenants. On the other hand, conservatism 
can also give rise to informational costs. The requirement of higher verification threshold 
for good news relative to bad news results in the pooling of some good news with bad news 
disclosures, increasing uncertainty when low accounting reports are observed (Gigler, 
Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan 2009). Consistent with contractual benefits, I find that 
conservatism reduces bond spreads by making covenants more effective. In contrast, the 
increased uncertainty due to conservatism leads to higher bond spreads. Overall, I find that 
the informational cost of increased uncertainty exceeds the contractual benefits of 
conservatism resulting in higher bond spreads when accounting is conservative.  
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1. Introduction 
The role of conservatism as a prominent feature of accounting practice is extensively 
studied in the literature. Following the argument in Watts (2003) that accounting conservatism 
improves debt-contracting efficiency, prior studies investigate the implications of conservatism for 
the borrower-lender relationship. Several studies focus on the contractual benefits of conservatism 
in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002, 
Beatty et al. 2008, Ball and Shivakumar 2005), particularly in enhancing the effectiveness of debt 
covenants (e.g., Zhang 2008, Nikolaev 2010). While prior research documents the benefits of 
conservatism for debtholders, empirical evidence of the potential costs of conservatism is scarce. 
In this paper, I analyze the costs as well as the benefits of accounting conservatism by examining 
its effect on bond pricing at both the initiation stage and in the secondary market. 
In private lending, Zhang (2008) shows that accounting conservatism has an overall 
positive effect on interest spreads (i.e., results in lower interest spreads) because of the timely 
signaling of default risk through acceleration of covenant violations. It is not clear that the overall 
positive effect of conservatism observed in private lending extends to the bond market in which 
investors are widely dispersed and lack access to managerial private information. I expect that 
accounting conservatism will lead to more informational inefficiency relative to contractual 
benefits for bond investors in contrast with its effect on private lenders. As such, accounting 
conservatism may not lead to lower interest spreads in the bond market. I jointly investigate both 
the informational and the contractual effects of accounting conservatism to understand how 
conservatism affects bond interest spreads overall. 
Theoretical work by Gigler et al. (2009) shows that conservatism can reduce the 
informational efficiency of debt contracts under plausible conditions. Since conservatism requires 
higher verification threshold for the reporting of good news relative to bad news, these authors 
show that conservative accounting results in the pooling of some good news with bad news 
disclosures, thereby reducing the information content of low accounting reports. Using the Gigler 
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et al. (2009) framework, I first analytically show that the lower information content of bad news 
disclosures leads to increase in uncertainty due to conservatism and adversely impacts interest 
spreads. The bond market is an ideal setting to test this prediction of the potential cost of 
conservatism because the reliance on public information is stronger among bond investors than 
private lenders who have informational advantage due to their access to inside information (Fama 
1985, Nikolaev 2010). In my empirical analyses, I begin by testing the theoretical prediction that 
higher conservatism increases uncertainty for bond investors especially when accounting reports 
convey bad news. I then test whether this informational cost due to the uncertainty induced by 
conservatism increases the cost of debt as reflected in yield spreads of new bond issuances. 
 The contractual benefits of conservatism arise because it accelerates the triggering of 
tripwires built into covenants and facilitates the early transfer of control rights to creditors. I test 
whether this contractual benefit of covenants coupled with conservatism results in lower bond 
spreads. While conservatism increases the effectiveness of covenants for bond investors, the impact 
of this benefit on bond spreads is not expected to be that strong. Due to the dispersed nature of 
arms-length lenders, invoking contractual rights under a bond agreement is costlier and less feasible 
than in private loans (Myers 1977, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996). As such, in bond agreements 
relative to private debt, fewer covenants are included, thresholds are set looser, and renegotiation 
and loan termination following covenant violations are less common (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979, 
Begley and Freedman 2004, Li 2013). Thus, overall, I expect the informational cost of conservatism 
to exceed its contractual benefits for bond investors resulting in higher bond spreads. 
  I use data for a sample of 8,017 U.S. public bonds issued between 1988 and 2016 as 
reported in the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). My primary measure of firm-
quarter conservatism is defined as the difference between the skewness of cash flows from 
operations and the skewness of income before extraordinary items following Givoly and Hayn 
(2000) and Beatty et al. (2008). This measure also captures the characterization of conservatism in 
Gigler et al. (2009) as a stochastic shift in accounting reports. Prior studies have shown that this 
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measure captures the effect of both conditional and unconditional conservatism on accounting 
reports (e.g., Zhang 2008).1 
To test the hypothesis that conservatism increases uncertainty among bond investors 
especially when reports reflect low performance, I regress firms’ bond return volatility as a measure 
of uncertainty on the lagged measure of conservatism, its interaction with a negative earnings 
indicator, and other determinants of return volatility. Consistent with my prediction, I find that 
conservatism is associated with higher bond return volatility. Moreover, I find a significantly 
positive coefficient on the interaction term indicating that conservatism reduces the informativeness 
of low reports in particular, likely because low reports are more important to bond holders due to 
their asymmetric payoff functions.  
Relying on this finding, I define the informational cost of conservatism as the predicted 
value of bond return volatility based on the combined effect of conservatism and conservatism 
interacted with negative earnings. Since conservatism is expected to benefit bond investors by 
accelerating covenant violations, I capture the contractual benefits of conservatism by using the 
intensity of earnings-based covenants and the interaction of covenant intensity with conservatism. 
From a regression explaining bond yield spreads of new issuances, I find that initial bond spreads 
increase with conservatism-induced uncertainty and decrease with covenant intensity coupled with 
conservatism. I find that each of the two effects – informational and contractual – remains 
significant in the presence of the other, which highlights the importance of both channels through 
which conservatism can affect bond yields. However, when I regress bond yield spreads on the 
overall measure of conservatism (rather than its cost and benefit), I find that conservatism 
significantly increases the yield spreads on new bonds. Moreover, this positive association is 
                                                          
1 Unconditional (or news independent) conservatism refers to the conservative reporting of the book value of 
assets and liabilities at their inception (e.g., immediate expensing of most R&D outlays, LIFO inventory 
valuation, accelerated depreciation), whereas conditional (or news dependent) conservatism refers to the 
accounting of adverse circumstances faster than favorable circumstances (e.g., asset impairment, lower of 
cost or market of non-financial assets). See Beaver and Ryan (2005) for a comprehensive discussion. 
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significantly stronger when earnings are negative, supporting my prediction that overall, the 
informational cost of conservatism exceeds its contractual benefits in the bond market. 
To further understand the association between conservatism-induced uncertainty and the 
cost of bonds, I perform a series of cross-sectional tests. First, I expect that investors of firms with 
better information environment will have more access to other sources of information and place 
less reliance on public accounting reports. Consequently, the negative impact of uncertainty due to 
conservatism on bond investors should be attenuated leading to a lower demand for high interest 
rates. Conversely, when the information environment of a firm is poor, the increased reliance of 
bond investors on public reports should lead to a higher demand for uncertainty price protection. 
Consistent with this prediction, for firms in the highest tercile of analyst following and firm size 
and the lowest tercile of analysts’ forecast dispersion, I find a significantly lower association 
between bond yield spreads and conservatism-induced uncertainty. Second, due to their asymmetric 
payoff functions, bondholders will be less concerned about the uncertainty induced by conservatism 
when borrowers are financially strong or have secured bonds with their assets. Consistently, I find 
that the informational cost of conservatism has a significantly lower effect on bond interest rates 
for investment grade, higher rated, and asset-backed bonds. 
I also examine the informational role of conservatism in the secondary bond market. 
Focusing on the secondary market has the advantage that bond agreement terms, such as covenants 
or stated yields that are the contracting parties’ choice variables, are already set at the time of 
issuance and thus are less likely to influence the bond yields-to-maturity which are mainly based 
on the market’s available information. Moreover, unlike for initial bond issuances, underwriters 
with access to private information do not play a role in the secondary market. I construct a large 
sample of 120,612 bond-quarters in the secondary market covering the period 2004-2016 obtained 
from Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) as well as WRDS (a new data set of bond 
returns based on TRACE data). Using bid-ask spreads as the measure of uncertainty, I first show 
that conservatism is positively associated with bid-ask spreads especially in the presence of 
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negative earnings. Consistent with my findings for the new bond issues sample, I find that the 
conservatism-induced uncertainty is associated with higher yield spreads of traded bonds. 
In their joint conceptual framework, the IASB and the FASB appear to downplay the 
benefits of conservatism as suggested by their statement that “The board…no longer recognizes 
accounting conservatism as a desirable quality of accounting” (FASB 2010 and IASB 2010). Yet, 
the majority of research studies document the benefits of conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 2006, 
Ahmed et al. 2002, Zhang 2008, Callen et al. 2015, LaFond and Watts 2008, Lara et al. 2011, 
Donovan et al. 2015, among others) and very few focus on the potential downside of reporting 
conservatively (e.g., Gigler et al. 2009, Guay and Verrecchia 2006, Dyreng et al. 2017). My paper 
attempts to close this gap by examining the benefits as well as the potential costs of conservatism. 
My analysis is based on the premise that the relative costs and benefits of accounting conservatism 
can vary across different stakeholders due to structural differences in their payoffs, information 
access, monitoring abilities, and renegotiation cost (Bharath et al. 2008, Li 2013, Armstrong et al. 
2010, Nikolaev 2010). While prior studies have documented benefits of conservatism in private 
lending, I find conservatism to impose net costs in the bond market due to the increase in 
uncertainty generated by the lower information content of bad news (Gigler et al. 2009). 
My paper is perhaps the first to explore the effect of conservative reporting on uncertainty 
as well as bond pricing in the secondary bond market. The secondary bond market provides a 
powerful setting to test the informational effect of conservatism, because investors’ reliance on 
public reports is arguably stronger than at the bond issuance stage as well as in initial and secondary 
private loan markets. My findings reveal that conservatism exacerbates information asymmetry in 
the secondary bond market - in contrast with its marginal impact on the secondary loan market 
(Wittenberg-Moerman 2008). Overall, my paper contributes to the literature by highlighting that 
conservatism benefits for bond investors may not be as significant as documented for shareholders 
or private lenders. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background and related literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes data and 
variable measurement and presents empirical specifications. Section 5 presents empirical results 
for the new bond issuance sample as well as the secondary bond market. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and Related Literature 
2.1 Bond market setting 
Global corporate bond markets have almost tripled in size since 2000 reaching $49 trillion 
of principal outstanding in 2013, comprising 24% of total corporate financing. The U.S. bond 
market has played an increasingly important role in corporate borrowing in the past 20 years. 
During 2016 alone, nearly 1,400 companies issued a total of $1.55 trillion in corporate bonds to 
fund their operations, amounting to an annual growth rate of 7.5% since 1996.2 Investment grade 
bond issuance set an all-time record for the fifth straight year in 2016, with $1,270 trillion raised 
across 1,065 issues. At the end of 2016, the total value of U.S. corporate bonds outstanding 
amounted to $8.5 trillion compared to $2.1 trillion in 1996. Moreover, the volume of trade in the 
secondary corporate bond market has reached $30.0 billion in 2016 exhibiting growth of 68.5% 
since 2003.3  
Despite the growing importance of bonds relative to other means of financing, bond 
investors face several disadvantages relative to equity investors and private lenders. First, unlike 
shareholders and private lenders, bondholders typically cannot participate in the decision making 
process of borrowing firms. Stock investors can influence and monitor executives via several 
channels such as selecting board members, providing compensation and dismissal incentives to 
                                                          
2 During the same period, new private corporate loans increased from $1.0 trillion in 1996 to $2.3 trillion in 
2016, an annual growth rate of 4.04%. New equity issuances (sum of IPOs and SEOs) at the end of 2016 
totaled $197.6 billion, growing at an annual rate of 0.05% since 2000. 
3 Sources: Sifma.org statistics, Thomson Reuter’s 2016 “Debt Capital Market Review” and “Global 
Syndicated Loans Review,” Iosco 2014 report on “Corporate Bond Markets,” Bloomberg 2016 report on 
“Global Syndicated Loans”. 
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managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980, Smith and Watts 1982), posing exit threats 
(Hirschman 1970), or via proxy fights and takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Similarly, private 
lenders, particularly banks, have extensive means to influence firms’ decisions. Not only can these 
lenders take over control subsequent to default (Diamond 1984, Grossman and Hart 1982, Bolton 
and Scharfstein 1990), but they can also intervene in corporate decisions by threatening to 
accelerate or terminate short-term loans in the event of covenant violations. Moreover, in countries 
with bank-oriented financial systems such as Germany, Japan, and France, bankers have even more 
power over corporate policies because they act as both lenders and block holders who directly sit 
on boards of most firms.4 
Second, bond investors are also at an informational disadvantage relative to both equity 
investors and private lenders. Private lenders’ existence depends upon their ability to efficiently 
monitor borrowers (Diamond 1984). To achieve this goal they acquire and process a wide range of 
public and non-public information of their borrowers which places them in a superior informational 
position relative to bondholders.5 While both equity and bond investors have access only to publicly 
available information, the informational disadvantage of bond investors is greater. Board members, 
as representatives of shareholders, have access to the same insider information as private lenders, 
so that shareholder rights are better protected. Moreover, the considerably lower liquidity of the 
secondary bond market relative to the stock market may impede the price discovery process in the 
bond market.6 
In this paper, I study the informational and contractual effects of conservatism in the bond 
market. Since bond investors rely on public information more than firms’ other major claimants 
                                                          
4 Ownership of common stock by banks and other financial institutions was 12.1%, 10.5%, 9.0% and 2.3% 
of total shares outstanding in France, Germany, Japan and the U.S., respectively, in 2002 (Tirole 2006). 
5 Consistently, Altman, Grande and Saunders (2010) find the secondary loan market to be informationally 
more efficient than the secondary bond market prior to a loan default.  
6 Kwan (1996), Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminaathan (2005) and Downing, Underwood and Xing (2009) 
find that the corporate bond market is less informationally efficient than the stock market. Hotchkiss and 
Ronen (2002), however, find that both markets are equally efficient in incorporating news. 
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while having the least influence on corporate decisions, including accounting choices, I expect the 
bond market to provide an ideal setting for investigating the informational effects of accounting 
conservatism. This is consistent with Bharath et al. (2008) and Nikoleav (2010) who posit that 
accounting quality attributes could have a more pronounced effect on bond investors compared to 
private lenders. 
 
2.2 Accounting regulation and conservatism 
In recent years, there appears to be a gap between the accounting standard-setters’ view of 
conservatism and the accounting empirical literature as regards the potential costs of conservative 
reporting. The IASB/FASB joint conceptual framework excludes both conservatism and prudence 
from the list of desirable qualities of accounting information. In their joint discussion, the two 
boards agree that neutrality of accounting has higher importance than conservatism or prudence: 
“The boards concluded that describing prudence or conservatism as a desirable quality or response 
to uncertainty would conflict with the quality of neutrality.” (IASB, 2006, BC2.22). The vote to 
exclude conservatism and prudence was not a unanimous one; some respondents to the “Discussion 
Paper and Exposure Draft” disagreed with this view and suggested that the framework should 
include either conservatism or prudence because bias should not always be assumed to be 
undesirable, especially in circumstances when bias produces information that is more relevant to 
some users (BC3.27). Moreover, others stated that conservative estimates of assets, liabilities, 
income, or equity could counteract the effects of managerial tendency to report optimistic estimates 
(BC3.28). 
Ultimately, the final draft excluded conservatism and prudence from the list of desirable attributes 
of accounting, since they could lead to understatement of assets or overstatement of liabilities in 
one period and overstatement of financial performance in subsequent periods - a result that the 
IASB and the FASB did not view as either prudent or neutral. As reflected in their discussions, the 
standard-setters were considering both benefits and costs of conservatism as well as their 
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differential importance for different users. In line with the IASB/FASB’s reasoning, Lambert 
(2010) calls for future research to address the important question of how the costs and benefits of 
conservatism weigh up against each other and what degree of accounting conservatism is optimal, 
rather than viewing conservatism as what he phrases as “zero-one or all-or-nothing”. This study 
examines the effect of potential costs as well as benefits of conservatism for bond investors as a 
response to the call for further research in Lambert (2010). 
 
2.3 Prior research  
2.3.1 Contractual benefits of conservatism 
Accounting information provides valuable inputs to enforceable contractual arrangements, 
facilitating outsiders of a firm to monitor and discipline insiders who enjoy informational advantage 
and controlling rights. Following the argument in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Watts (2003a, 
2003b) that conservatism can enhance the efficiency of debt contracting, the beneficial role of 
conservatism for debt holders has been extensively studied.  
The contractual benefit for debt holders arises because conservatism accelerates the 
triggering of tripwires built into covenants which provide a timely signal of default risk and 
facilitate the early transfer of control right to creditors (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). In line with 
this argument, Zhang (2008) finds that the frequency of covenant violations for borrowers that 
experienced severe negative shocks increases with the degree of reporting conservatism. 
Furthermore, Ahmed et al. (2002) find that firms with greater bondholder–shareholder conflicts 
over dividend policy have higher levels of conservatism, supporting the beneficial role of 
conservatism in mitigating agency problems inherent in debt contracting. More recently, Tan 
(2013) finds that financial reporting conservatism increases immediately after covenant violations. 
Similarly, Donovan et al. (2015) document that creditors of firms with more conservative 
accounting prior to default have significantly higher recovery rates and speedier bankruptcy 
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resolution. Moreover, they show that these benefits are stronger if the borrower violated covenants 
before the default. 
 Beatty et al. (2008) also state that the inclusion of income escalator provisions in private 
lending agreements is consistent with lenders requiring conservative modifications to the contracts. 
However, Li (2010) documents that conservative adjustments to private debt contracts (i.e., 
including certain types of negative earnings but excluding the corresponding positive earnings), are 
not common in the negotiated measurement rules and all such conservative (one-sided) adjustments 
are aimed at removing transitory earnings. In contrast, using a sample of actual realizations of 
earnings used for determining covenant compliance in loan contracts, Dyreng, Vashishtha, and 
Weber (2017) find that these adjusted earnings are less conservative than GAAP earnings. 
Another line of research investigates the complementarity effect of accounting 
conservatism and creditors’ protection via covenants. The debt covenant hypothesis (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986) predicts that managers of borrowing firms have incentives to make accounting 
decisions that prevent the violation of covenants thereby impairing their effectiveness in reducing 
agency conflicts. Sweeney (1994) finds results consistent with this prediction. Beatty et al. (2008) 
and Nikolaev (2010) argue that conservatism could address this problem by undoing management’s 
positive bias, thus accelerating the violation of covenants. In a sample of private loans, Beatty et 
al. (2008) document that the use of income escalators and tangible net worth covenants in credit 
agreements increases with reporting conservatism. Nikolaev (2010) states that covenants protect 
creditors only if the accounting system is conservative. In a sample of bond issuances, he 
documents that reliance on different groups of covenants increases with conservatism. These 
studies suggest that conservatism and covenants have complementary effects in reducing agency 
costs of debt. In sum, some prior studies find evidence that conservative accounting helps to 
mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. 
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2.3.2 Conservative accounting and the cost of debt 
Very few prior studies examine the effect of accounting conservatism on the cost of debt. 
Since conservatism reinforces the contractual protection of creditors against borrowers’ wealth 
appropriation, we would expect to observe a positive impact of conservatism on interest spreads. 
Ahmed et al. (2002) provide indirect evidence by showing that, for a sample of firms facing 
bondholder-shareholder conflict over dividend policy, accounting conservatism improves bond-
issuers’ credit ratings. For a sample of 314 private loans of firms that experienced severe negative 
shocks during 1999-2000, Zhang (2008) finds a negative association between yield-spreads and 
accounting conservatism.12 More recently, Callen et al. (2015) show that when information 
asymmetry over payouts is high, high levels of conservatism coupled with tight covenants reduce 
private loan spreads, whereas no such relationship exists when the extent of information asymmetry 
is low.  
 
2.3.3 Informational impact of conservatism 
Direct empirical evidence on the informational impact of conservatism on creditors is 
rather limited. Watts (2003a) argues that although conservatism is a means to offset managers’ 
positive earnings bias, in practice, it more than offsets managerial bias resulting in deferral of 
earnings and understatement of net assets and cumulative earnings. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), 
on the other hand, state that timely loss recognition benefits creditors by providing more accurate 
ex-ante information for loan pricing. Guay and Verrecchia (2006) distinguish between potential 
contractual benefits and informational inefficiencies of timely loss recognition. They emphasize 
that for timely loss recognition to represent an efficient contracting mechanism, its contracting 
benefits must more than compensate its informational inefficiencies. Similarly, emphasizing the 
                                                          
12 In contrast with multivariate analyses, univariate analyses in both Ahmed et al. (2002) and Zhang (2008) 
show that the sign of the relation between credit ratings and conservatism varies depending on the measure 
of conservatism used. 
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potential costs and benefits of conservative reporting, Lambert (2010) argues that conservatism has 
been a necessary response to measurement problems but not a desired attribute of accounting per 
se. 
Empirically, Ball et al. (2008) investigate the effect of conservatism on the structure of 
syndicated loans. These authors find that arrangers of syndicated loan agreements hold a smaller 
proportion of new loans when borrowers’ accounting reports capture credit deterioration in a timely 
fashion, indicating lower information asymmetry among syndicate members. Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2008) documents that timely loss recognition lowers the information asymmetry (as measured by 
the bid-ask spread) among the players of the secondary loan market. On the theory side, the 
statistical characterization of conservatism in Gigler et al. (2009) highlights that both conditional 
and unconditional types of conservatism will increase the information content of high earnings 
values and decrease that of low earnings values. Similarly, Beja and Weiss (2006) theoretically 
demonstrate that the type of conservatism that requires reporting less optimistic estimates (e.g., 
lower of cost or market) reduces upside estimation errors at the cost of increased downside errors. 
The studies discussed above collectively suggest that lenders have an asymmetric demand 
for timely loss recognition and that higher verification thresholds for gains relative to losses will 
result in more release of bad news than good news. Nonetheless, to what degree the benefits of 
increased timeliness of losses are offset by the costs of asymmetric reporting remains an unresolved 
question; the answer will likely vary across different markets and stakeholders as I discuss below. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Informational costs of conservatism 
As discussed above, accounting conservatism could affect yield spreads of debt via 
contractual and informational channels. Gigler et al. (2009) argue that, by requiring stricter 
verifiability standards for disclosing good news compared to bad news, conservatism results in 
more disclosure of income decreasing events relative to income increasing events. These authors 
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characterize the statistical properties of conservatism and demonstrate that the variation in the 
degree of conservatism leads to the variation in the information content of financial reports. They 
argue that, despite the increase in the frequency of bad news disclosure due to conservatism, such 
reports would have lower information content. These authors expect conservatism to increase the 
information content of good news reports and reduce the information content of bad news reports. 
I extend the analysis in Gigler et al. (2009) by constructing a simple two-period model 
presented in Appendix I. In this section, I discuss the intuition behind the model and its predictions. 
At the beginning of the first period, a creditor and a borrower write a lending agreement in which 
the creditor’s payoff is determined by the realization of cash flows at the end of the second period. 
At an interim date, the accounting system generates a high or low report based on news about future 
cash flows and the degree of accounting conservatism. If the report reflects poor performance, a 
covenant included in the lending agreement transfers control rights to the creditor who will 
liquidate the firm at a low value. Consistent with Gigler et al. (2009), I capture the effect of 
conservatism on the mapping between the input to the accounting system and the output (i.e., 
report), by assuming that the accounting system reports bad news immediately with probability 
one, but holds good news disclosure to a higher verification threshold. The stricter verifiability 
requirement for good news results in good news being reported as good with a probability less than 
one. This reporting regime will result in the immediate disclosure of all bad news but it pools it 
with some good news which temporarily is misclassified as bad news. This pooling effect increases 
the creditor’s uncertainty about the borrower’s true cash flows when low reports are observed.14  
Consistent with the model, I expect conservatism to increase bondholders’ uncertainty 
about the borrowers’ future cash flows especially when accounting reports reflect low performance. 
My first hypothesis tests this prediction: 
                                                          
14 In a similar vein, Bertomeu, Darrough, and Xue (2017) show that conservatism, by increasing the quality 
of high earnings reports, provides more useful information in eliciting effort which enhances the efficiency 
of pay-for-performance contracts. On the other hand, the increased frequency of unfavorable reports due to 
conservatism incentivizes managers to manipulate earnings upwards. 
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H1a: Conservatism increases bondholders’ uncertainty. 
H1b: Conservatism increases bondholders’ uncertainty significantly more when issuers  
         report losses. 
Gigler et al. (2009) predict that while conservatism decreases the information content of 
low reports, it increases that of high reports. Due to their asymmetric payoff functions, creditors 
are less concerned about the quality of high accounting reports than low ones. Therefore, I do not 
expect the higher informativeness of positive reports to offset the costs associated with the 
reduction in the informativeness of negative reports. Accordingly, my model predicts that bond 
investors will price protect themselves ex-ante against the increase in uncertainty due to 
conservatism by demanding higher yield spread on new bonds. My second hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H2: The uncertainty induced by accounting conservatism increases bond yield spreads. 
 
3.2 Contractual benefits of conservatism 
Debt covenants play a central role in mitigating the agency problems between debtholders 
and shareholders. When companies approach financial distress, covenants govern the transfer of 
control rights from shareholders to debtholders to limit firms’ opportunistic expropriation of wealth 
from debtholders. (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Myers 1977, Smith and Warner 1979) In their 
seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that firms voluntarily forfeit their flexibility in 
order to lower bondholders’ agency risk and reduce the cost of debt financing.16 Therefore, I expect 
more restrictive earnings performance triggers to increase lenders’ expected payoffs and thus 
reduce bond yield spreads. 
                                                          
16 In contrast, Miller (1977) discusses the co-presence of covenants and convertibility in debt contracts. He 
calls covenants as the “neutral mutation” of security design and including them in contracts as habitual with 
no clear cost or benefit. 
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However, as the “debt covenant hypothesis” predicts, managers have incentives to make 
reporting choices that reduce the likelihood of violation of accounting-based covenants (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986 and 1990, Sweeney 1994, Dichev and Skinner 2002, DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994). As prior literature documents, conservatism addresses this agency problem by accelerating 
the triggering of tripwires built into covenants and facilitating the early transfer of control rights to 
creditors, thereby reducing the wealth appropriation risks that creditors would bear otherwise 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Watts 2003a, Zhang 2008, Nikolaev 2010). Therefore, I capture the 
contractual benefits of conservatism as the combined effect of conservatism and the intensity of 
earnings covenants. I focus on earnings covenants as opposed to a broader set of covenants because 
the effect of conservatism is typically captured by its effect on reported earnings. My third set of 
hypotheses summarizes the above discussion: 
H3a: The intensity of earnings covenants reduces bond yield spreads. 
H3b: The intensity of earnings covenants reduces bond yield spreads significantly more  
         when accounting conservatism is high. 
 
3.3 Overall effect of conservatism on bonds yield spreads  
Having identified the two separate channels through which accounting conservatism 
affects bond yield spreads, I next make predictions about the overall association of conservatism 
and yield spreads for bonds. Prior studies have documented that conservatism reduces the cost of 
borrowing in private loans (Zhang 2008). However, due to structural differences between bonds 
and private loans, it is not clear that the same effect would be observed in the bond market. 
I expect the contractual benefits of conservatism to be less significant for bonds because 
prior literature highlights that contractual benefits for bondholders are in general weaker than for 
private lenders. Myers (1977), Diamond (1984), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) predict that the 
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dispersion of outside creditors can make invoking of contractual rights costly and less feasible.18 
Even though bond contracts give control rights to bondholders via inclusion of covenants, 
following a technical default, the dispersed bondholders must overcome costs of collective action, 
such as information processing costs, before their control rights can be exercised. Moreover, the 
coordination of successful renegotiation and effective collective action against borrowers suffers 
from information and free-rider problems (Rajan 1992).  
Consistent with minimal benefits of control rights transfer and high cost of recourse in the 
event of technical default for bonds, prior studies document that on average bond agreements 
include fewer and less restrictive covenants compared to loan contracts (e.g., Smith and Warner 
1979, Begley and Freedman 2004, Nini et al. 2009). As a result, technical defaults are more 
common in private loan issues (Kahan and Tuckman 1995, Verde 1999, Chen and Wei 1993)19. In 
the event of bond covenant violations, renegotiation and loan termination are less common (Chava 
and Roberts 2008). Also, since the U.S. legal system includes the “Doctrine of Waiver,” if 
bondholders waive their right against a violation once, they effectively could give up that right in 
the future as well (Rajan and Winton 1995). Additionally, while private loan contracts mostly 
include maintenance covenants which require borrowers’ continued compliance, bond covenants 
typically are incurrence covenants which only require compliance when the borrower intends to 
take certain actions. As such, even when borrowers’ financial ratios fall below incurrence covenants 
thresholds, it may not trigger a technical default for an extended period of time. Therefore, since 
                                                          
18 The discussion about the fundamental differences between bond investors and private lenders goes back to 
Dewing (1914) who states in his book “Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations” that: “[banks] have been 
more alert to the situation than bondholders because they are in closer touch with the business.” 
19 Verde (1999) finds that restrictions in bond contracts relative to loans are “generally loose and add little 
value in protecting bondholders”.  Similarly, Kahan and Tuckman (1993) who also compare bond and loan 
agreements report that typically private lending contracts “more aggressively control the actions of 
shareholders by setting various covenants more tightly”.  
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the contractual protection of bondholders tends to be weak, I do not expect the contractual benefits 
of conservatism (via acceleration of covenant violations) to be that strong for bond investors.20 
On the other hand, the informational cost of conservatism is likely to be more significant 
for bond investors than for private lenders. This is because, while private lenders have access to 
extensive information during the course of the lending agreement, a typical arm's-length 
bondholder receives only public information. Fama (1985) argues that for firms with high 
information asymmetry it would be cheaper to grant one agent (loan arranger) direct access to inside 
information than to produce a wide range of public information to make bond issuance a viable 
method of financing for such firms. 
During the process of lending, private lenders receive a large set of information, including 
information on firm's projections, ability to meet targets, reliability and competence of personnel, 
which are sometimes generated and communicated even in real-time (Rajan 1992). Additionally, 
subsequent to signing credit agreements, private lenders have an ongoing raft of confidential 
correspondence with issuers which includes periodic financial disclosures, advance warnings of 
earnings results, covenant compliance information, amendment and waiver requests, financial 
projections, as well as plans for acquisitions or dispositions (Wittenberg-Moerman 2008). Note that 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibits selective disclosure of nonpublic 
information, exempts issuers to disclose such information if the offering is not required to be 
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (e.g., private loans).21 Much of the information that 
private lenders receive is material financial information that may remain out of the public domain 
for a long period until it is publicly disclosed or revealed via bank mark-to-market pricing services 
                                                          
20 Note that bondholders’ protection is generally achieved by granting them higher seniority relative to private 
loans rather than by including state-contingent terms in contracts. Private loans, especially bank loans, usually 
stand last or close to last in priority among firms’ fixed payment contracts (Fama 1985). 
21 Initially, credit agencies were also exempted from Reg FD. However, Section 939B of the Dodd‐Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 amended Reg FD to eliminate this exemption. 
Following this amendment, firms can disclose material information to credit agencies only if an agreement 
between the issuer and the credit rating agency imposes a confidentiality obligation or establishes the 
requisite fiduciary duty. 
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or CDS trades. In contrast, bondholders, as outsiders, can only rely on publicly available 
information that borrowers disclose or information from other public sources such as independent 
audits and bond ratings (Fama 1985). 
In addition to access to privileged information, private lenders also have more incentive to 
collect information about borrowers (Bushman et al. 2010, Li et al. 2016, Prilmeier 2017, Dichev 
and Skinner 2002). For example, Rajan and Winton (1995) demonstrate that banks, due to higher 
intensity of covenants included in loan agreements, have higher incentives to monitor and gather 
information about borrowers than public bond lenders.22 Collectively, prior evidence shows that 
privileged access and independent information acquisition enhances the information environment 
in the private lending setting. 
Consistent with significant contractual benefits and low informational costs, Zhang (2008) 
shows that accounting conservatism overall leads to lower interest spreads for private lenders. In 
contrast, bond investors are informationally disadvantaged as discussed above leading to higher 
informational costs of accounting conservatism (Gigler et al. 2009). Since the informational cost 
of conservatism is expected to be high and the contractual benefits of conservatism are expected to 
be weak for bond investors, I predict that, overall, accounting conservatism increases bond yield 
spreads. Thus, in contrast with the prior finding that accounting conservatism reduces interest 
spreads of private loans (Zhang 2008), my fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
H4a: Accounting conservatism increases the yield spreads of bonds. 
H4b: Accounting conservatism increases the yield spreads of bonds significantly more  
         when issuers report losses. 
 
4. Data, Sample and Variable Definitions 
                                                          
22 The theoretical explanation for the value of information acquisition after a covenant violation was first 
studied in Townsend’s (1979) costly state verification (CSV) model. 
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4.1 Data and sample 
The primary data for this study is compiled from different sources. I use the Fixed Income 
Securities Database (FISD) to obtain data for new bond issuances including covenants and bond 
ratings at issuance, CRSP for stock return data, benchmark treasury yields, corporate’s S&P ratings 
and historical CUSIPS information, CRSP/Compustat quarterly database for firms’ quarterly 
accounting data, Trades Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) for secondary bond market 
intraday transactions, and the new WRDS Bond Returns dataset for bond yields and bid-ask 
spreads.  
I restrict the sample to 1988-2016 period. My sample starts in 1988 because I require 
uniformly-defined quarterly cash flow information used to construct my main measure of 
accounting conservatism. I exclude bond issues that are not offered by U.S. domiciled firms 
(Yankee), and those which are not denominated in U.S. dollars. I also exclude private placements, 
144a, convertible, exchangeable, and puttable issues as they are hybrid issues which share 
properties with other classes of securities (Edward, Harris, and Piwowar 2007, Kerr and Ozel 2015, 
and Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu 2008). Furthermore, I require bonds to have data on 
offering yield, amount, offering date, maturity, seniority, covenants, and security level available on 
FISD. My final sample is the intersection of this sample with other required data and contains 8,017 
observations of new bond issues. 
To construct the firm-quarter bond return volatility measure, I use intra-day corporate 
bonds transaction data on the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) dataset provided 
by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). After the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) completed phase 3 of the TRACE project, TRACE covers 99% of all 
OTC transactions and 95% of all secondary transactions of U.S. corporate bonds (Edwards, Harris, 
and Piwowar 2007). Moreover, after 2005, FINRA requires all OTC trades to be reported within 
15 minutes. The only transactions which are not reported in TRACE are those taking place on 
exchanges such as the NYSE. To obtain bond daily prices, I follow the procedure described in 
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Bessembinder et al. (2009) and Dick-Nielson et al. (2012) and eliminate all cancellations, 
corrections, reversals, commission and special trades, single trades larger than offering size, and 
truncated top and bottom 1% of the remaining clean prices to minimize the effect of erroneous 
observations. Then, I define bond daily prices as the trade weighted average of all daily 
transactions. To construct quarterly return volatility, I impose further liquidity and duration 
requirements on quarterly bond transactions to ensure return volatility captures the underlying 
corporate information. I require bonds to be traded at least 45 times per quarter and first and last 
trades of each quarter to be at least 41 trading days apart, so they occur in the first and last months 
of corresponding fiscal quarters respectively (Lin et al. 2011 and Bao et al. 2011). The intersection 
of this sample with other required data yields 24,041 firm-level and 83,482 bond-level 
observations. 
I also extract the secondary bond market’s bid-ask information from the new WRDS Bond 
Returns dataset. This dataset contains firm-level quarterly bond transaction data such as quarterly 
yields, returns, and average bid-ask spreads. Merging this dataset with other required variables 
results in 120,612 firm-quarter observations. All variables are truncated at the top and bottom 1% 
of observations to reduce the effect of outliers. 
 
4.2 Conservatism measure 
My primary measure of firm-quarter conservatism is defined as the difference between the 
skewness of cash flows and the skewness of earnings following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Beatty 
et al. (2008). For each firm-quarter, I measure conservatism as the difference between the skewness 
of operating cash flows (deflated by assets) and earnings before extraordinary items (deflated  by 
assets) using a maximum of 20 and a minimum of 5 prior quarters. Thus, higher values of this 
measure reflect higher conservatism.  
I use this measure as my primary conservatism measure for several reasons; first, it captures 
the characterization of conservatism in Gigler et al. (2009) as a stochastic shift in accounting reports 
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which I employ to develop my analytical predictions. Second, as discussed earlier, in their joint 
conceptual framework, FASB and IASB state that their main concern about conservative (and 
prudent) reporting is the introduction of bias into reports. From a statistical standpoint, bias in a 
random variable can be expressed as the third moment of its distribution. Thus, I use a relative 
skewness-based measure of conservatism to directly capture potential reporting biases. Third, prior 
literature has shown that this measure captures the effect of both conditional and unconditional 
conservatism on accounting reports (Givoly and Hyan 2000, Zhang 2008, Gigler et al. 2009). While 
the skewness measure is appealing in the context of this paper, in robustness tests, I also use 
negative non-operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000, Ahmed and Duellman 2007, and Beatty 
et al. 2008), the un-amortized portion of R&D expenses (Penman and Zhang 2002), and the firm-
specific asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism (Basu 1997) due to its popularity in the 
accounting literature.   
 
4.3 Covenants 
Since my primary conservatism measure, is the skewness of earnings relative to that of 
cash flows, I limit attention to earnings-based covenants to capture the reinforcing effect of 
covenants in the presence of conservatism. I define the intensity of earnings covenants 
(NEarn_Cov) as the total number of covenants explicitly related to earnings as reported on the 
FISD dataset (i.e., fixed_charge_coverage_is, fixed_charge_coverage_sub, 
net_earnings_test_issuance). Thus, this variable can take a value between 0 and 3. I also include 
the total number of bond covenants (𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑣) as a control variable in all empirical specifications. 
This variable is defined as the sum of dividend, investment, financing, accounting and other 
covenants as classified in Nikolaev (2010) and can vary between 0 and 22. 
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4.4 Empirical specifications 
4.4.1 Conservatism and uncertainty in the bond market 
To test my first hypothesis that conservatism increases uncertainty among bond investors 
especially when reports reflect low performance, I regress firms’ quarterly bond return volatility, 
as a proxy for bond investors’ uncertainty, on the lagged measure of conservatism as well as its 
interaction with an indicator variable that takes a value of one for accounting loss-quarters. I control 
for several firm-level variables that could affect the volatility of bond returns as well as quarter and 
firm fixed effects. To test H1a, I use the following specification and expect 𝛽1 to be significantly 
positive: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀𝑗𝑡−1 +
                        𝛽6𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                     (1) 
where 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑡 are bond, firm, and quarter indices, respectively. To test H1b, I augment equation 
(1) with its interaction with a loss variable (as defined below) and expect 𝛽2 to be significantly 
positive: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
                        𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                                            (2)                                                                    
where 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 is the same set of control variables included in equation (1). 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙 equals the 
quarterly measure of bond return volatility defined as the standard deviation of daily bond returns 
during a quarter. I define 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 as the fraction of the past 20 quarters with negative earnings before 
extraordinary items. 
I control for several known determinants of return volatility following Bao and Pan (2013) 
and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011). Vuolteenaho (2002) has shown that returns can be 
decomposed into news about expected return and expected cash flows. Therefore, I control for the 
volatility of firms’ prior cash flows (𝑉𝐶𝐹𝑂) because variation in cash flows is likely to be mirrored 
in variation in returns. I also, control for leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣) and bond ratings (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) because both 
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capture firms’ financial distress risk which can affect the volatility of bond returns. I expect firms’ 
volatility to increase with leverage and decrease with ratings. I also expect returns of smaller firms 
to be more sensitive to corporate news as they have less ability to absorb negative corporate shocks 
and fewer assets to compensate lenders during the bankruptcy process. I predict the volatility of 
bond returns to be negatively associated with firm size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒). I control for firms’ growth 
opportunities by including the book-to-market ratio (B𝑀) because growth firms are more likely to 
have volatile performance and returns. Since bondholders have fixed claims against borrowers’ 
value, they are likely to be more sensitive to corporate news when borrowers are less profitable. 
Thus, I expect, firms’ profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴) to reduce the volatility of bond returns. Additionally, I 
control for corporate news that is known to the stock market which could have an impact on the 
bond market by including the compounded stock returns of the given quarter (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡).  
 
4.4.2 Informational cost of conservatism 
My second hypothesis (H2) predicts that the uncertainty induced by accounting 
conservatism increases bond yield spreads. I test this prediction using the following empirical 
specification: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀𝑗𝑡−1 +
                        𝛽6𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
                       𝛽11𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑀𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (3) 
where i and t represent bonds and offering periods, respectively. The dependent variable, Spread, 
is the yield spread of new bonds defined as the offering yield minus the yield of treasury securities 
issued during the same month with the closest maturity date to that of the corresponding bond. 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 equals the volatility of bond returns induced by conservatism and the interaction 
of conservatism (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣) and Loss variables from the firm-specific regression (2). The 
parameters of equation (1) are estimated separately for each new bond issuance over the same 5 to 
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20 prior quarters that are used to calculate the conservatism measure. Then, InfoCost is defined as 
the predicted volatility of returns explained by the most recent values of 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣 and its interaction 
with 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠, i.e., InfoCostjt = ?̂?𝑗1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡 +  ?̂?𝑗2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡 + ?̂?𝑗3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡. I predict the 
coefficient on 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝛽1) to be significantly positive, confirming that uncertainty induced by 
conservatism increases the yield spread of new bonds.  
In equation (3), I also include several firm and bond specific control variables that are 
expected to impact bond interest rates. I expect larger and more profitable firms to issue bonds at 
lower interest rates as the extent of bondholder-shareholder conflict is potentially less severe. 
Similarly, higher leverage is associated with higher expected default and bankruptcy risk which 
should increase bond interest rates. I include ROA, Lev, BM, and Size as defined in the previous 
section to control for firm-level determinants of the cost of borrowing (Fama and French 1993, 
Gebhardt et al. 2005, Zhang 2008, Ahmed et al. 2002). Another subtle reason for including firm 
profitability (ROA) is to control for the mechanical association between earnings skewness and the 
mean earnings. As earnings become more negatively skewed, its mean also shifts to the left which 
could cause an increase in bond spreads. However, my main conjecture is that conservatism 
increases yield spreads by increasing uncertainty rather than by simply lowering operating 
performance measures. Controlling for earnings profitability ensures that any association between 
conservatism and yields is not due to a decline in operating performance. I also control for other 
terms of bond contracts as they are simultaneously determined with interest rates. I expect higher 
bond ratings (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔), higher bond seniority (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦), and asset-backed bonds 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑) to have lower interest rates as they reflect lower risk of default and lower agency 
conflict between borrowers and lenders (Blume et al. 1991, Gebhardt et al. 2005, Bessembinder et 
al. 2008, Zhang 2008, Ahmed et al. 2002). I also, include bond issue size (𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝐴𝑚𝑡), time to 
maturity (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦), and total number of included covenants (𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑣), and an indicator for 
redeemable (𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) bonds (Blume et al. 1991, Gebhardt et al. 2005, Zhang 2008). I do not 
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have any prior expectations about their effect on interest rates, because prior literature finds that, 
beyond contractual values, these bond agreement terms could indicate other offsetting factors. For 
instance, while intensity of covenants could reduce the flexibility of borrowers to expropriate 
wealth from lenders (Beatty et al. 2002), it could also signal the severity of agency conflict between 
the two parties (Li et al. 2016). Similarly, while longer duration and larger size of bonds could 
increase lender exposure to borrowers’ risk, it could signal the credibility of the borrower as well.  
 
4.4.3 Contractual benefits of conservatism 
My third set of hypotheses predicts that earnings covenants reduce bond yield spreads 
and that this effect gets reinforced with level of accounting conservatism. To test H3a and H3b, I 
use the following two empirical specifications: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑀𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡          (4) 
and, 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
                        𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑀𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡            (5)  
where 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are same control variables used in equation (3). 𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣 equals the intensity 
of operating  performance covenants defined as the number of earnings-based covenants included 
in new bond contracts. H3a predicts that the coefficient on 𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣, 𝛽1, in equation (4) is 
significantly negative. 
To capture the reinforcing effect of accounting conservatism and intensity of earnings 
covenants, I interact 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣 and 𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣 in equation (5). A significantly negative coefficient 
on the interaction term, 𝛽3, will confirm the prediction in H3b. Thus, I refer to the combined effect 
of conservatism and earnings covenants (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣) as the “contractual benefit” of 
conservatism. 
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4.4.4 Overall effect of conservatism on bond yield spreads 
Lastly, I test the overall effect of conservatism on bond yield spreads (H4) by regressing 
yield spreads (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) on conservatism (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣) and other control variables, where indices and 
control variables are identical to those in equation (3). 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑀𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (6) 
and, 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1  +  𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
                         𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑀𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                     (7) 
H4a predicts that the coefficient on 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣, 𝛽1, in equation (6) is significantly positive. To test 
H4b that the effect of conservatism on bond yield spreads is stronger when accounting reports 
convey bad news, I interact 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣 and 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 in equation (7). A significantly positive coefficient 
on the interaction term, 𝛽2, will confirm the prediction in H4b. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Univariate results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of new bond issues. The average new bond 
offering size is $472.4 million. The average (median) duration of bonds is 11.3 (9.9) years. The 
average (median) number of covenants included in bonds is 6.7 (6.0), and the average (median) 
number of earnings covenants is 0.38 (0.0). The mean and median bond credit ratings at issuance 
are BBB and BBB+, respectively. The yield spreads on new bonds are on average 1.88% with a 
median of 1.43%. The reported income before extraordinary items of issuing firms on average 
exhibits more negative skewness than operating cash flows (positive difference of 0.67) indicating 
that on average issuing firms report income more conservatively. Moreover, firms that issue bonds 
appear to report income more conservatively compared to the Compustat population for which the 
positive difference in skewness is 0.616 (untabulated). Lastly, issuing firms on average are larger 
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and more profitable, and have higher leverage ratios compared to the population of issuing and 
non-issuing public firms. The average quarterly ROA, market capitalization, and leverage are 
0.958%, $26.4 billion, and 0.287 for issuing firms compared to -0.021%, $1.82 billion, and 0.186, 
respectively, for Compustat firms. 
 
5.2 Multivariate results 
5.2.1 Conservatism and uncertainty in the bond market 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present results of estimating equations (1) and (2) to test H1a 
and H1b at the bond-quarter level. I include quarter and issue fixed effects to control for aggregate 
trends and time invariant characteristics of bond issues. Standard errors are clustered at the issue 
level and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity of error 
terms. Consistent with H1a, lagged accounting conservatism is significantly positively associated 
with quarterly bond return volatility (coefficient=0.011, p-value <0.001). Moreover, as can be seen 
in the second column, the coefficient of the interaction term of conservatism and percentage of 
prior loss periods is significantly positive. This result confirms H1b that the effect of conservatism 
on bond investors’ uncertainty significantly increases with reported losses. The coefficient 
estimates on control variables are all as expected. The coefficient estimates on ROA, stock return, 
and Rating are significantly negative and the coefficient on Leverage is significantly positive 
indicating that firms with lower agency conflict and probability of financial distress exhibit lower 
variation in bond returns.  
To alleviate concerns about the influence of firms with multiple outstanding bonds, I also 
report the effect of conservatism on bond return volatility at the firm level by replacing the 
individual bond return volatility with the (equally-weighted) average return volatility of all bonds 
of the firm (Bessembinder et al. 2008). I include quarter and firm fixed effects to control for 
aggregate trends and time invariant characteristics of issuers. Standard errors are clustered at the 
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issuer level and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 present the firm-level results. Despite the decline in sample size to 
24,608 observations, the results in columns 3 and 4 remain significant, confirming the bond level 
results. The coefficient estimate on lagged conservatism is 0.01 and highly significant. Moreover, 
as predicted by H1b, the effect of conservatism on bond investors’ uncertainty is exacerbated as 
borrowers report more losses in preceding periods. 
 Overall, the bond-level and firm-level results in Table 2 confirm my first set of hypotheses 
that conservatism increases uncertainty among bond investors especially when financial reports 
convey bad news. As explained in the previous section, I refer to the increased uncertainty due the 
combined effect of conservatism and losses as the “informational cost” of conservative reporting 
in the bond market. 
 
5.2.2 Contractual benefit and informational cost of conservatism 
In this section, I examine the impact of costs and benefits of conservatism on yield spreads 
of new bond issues. Table 3 presents the empirical results of H2 and H3. The dependent variable 
in all columns is yield spreads of new bonds. I include offering month and industry fixed effects to 
control for time trends and period- and industry-specific determinants of bond yields. Standard 
errors are clustered at the industry level and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity of error terms. 
Column 1 of Table 3 provides results of tests of H2 using equation (3). As described in the 
previous section, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the predicted value of bond return volatility based on the combined 
effect of conservatism and conservatism interacted with negative earnings. Column 1 shows that 
the estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and significant (0.475, p-value<0.001). In terms 
of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in information cost of conservatism 
leads to 0.494% increase in bond yield spread in the following quarter. This result confirms my 
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prediction that conservative reporting imposes informational costs on bond investors who ex-ante 
price protect themselves by increasing interest rates.  
The estimated coefficients on control variables are also consistent with prior expectation. 
More profitable and larger firms issue bonds at lower interest rates whereas firms with more debt 
issue bonds at higher rates. As for other characteristics of bond issues, investors demand lower 
interest rates if the bond has more favorable rating, has higher seniority or is asset-backed as these 
provisions reduce the agency risk faced by bond investors.28 On the other hand, larger offering size 
and longer maturity increases investors’ exposure to borrower risk and are therefore unfavorably 
priced via demanded yields. Similarly, redeemable bonds provide an option to the issuer and is 
priced in interest rates accordingly. Of special interest is the significantly positive association of 
the total number of included covenants and the yield spread suggesting that more covenants lead to 
higher bond yields. In untabulated results, I replace the overall number of included covenants with 
its components as categorized in Nikolaev (2010). The results show that the intensity of accounting-
based covenants and those restricting investments are significantly negatively associated with yield 
spreads as expected and the intensity of covenants that restrict financing activities is negatively but 
insignificantly associated with spreads. This finding is consistent with Reisel (2014) who finds that 
restrictions on investment activities and issuing activities reduce the cost of debt. On the other hand, 
the intensity of covenants that restrict dividend payments is positively and significantly related to 
spreads, highlighting the signaling value of dividend covenants (Callen et al. 2015). Moreover, I 
find that the coefficient on the three-way interaction of conservatism, intensity of dividend 
covenants, and the borrowers’ dividend payout level is significant and negative, consistent with 
predictions in Callen et al. (2015). 
                                                          
28 Ahmed et al. (2002) document that accounting conservatism improves the credit ratings of firms, where 
conservatism is measured by the bias component of market-to-book ratio (Beaver and Ryan 200) and negative 
accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000). By including bond ratings as a control variable, my analysis shows that 
the effect of conservatism on bond yields is incremental to that of bond ratings. 
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Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report results of testing H3a and H3b. As can be seen in column 
2, the coefficient on the intensity of earnings covenants is significantly negative. In terms of 
economic significance, one additional earnings covenant in a bond agreement reduces yield spread 
by 0.356%. This indicates that requiring a minimum level of operating profitability will reduce the 
lenders’ exposure to borrowers’ risk of financial distress hence reducing demanded bond spreads. 
Column 3 confirms the prediction that accounting conservatism reinforces the protective value of 
covenants resulting in timelier intervention of lenders when borrowers approach default. The 
coefficient estimate on the interaction of conservatism and the intensity of earnings covenants is -
0.025 (significant at the 3% level) indicating that more earnings covenants coupled with 
conservative reporting benefits lenders and results in lower bond interest rates. Thus, I refer to the 
combined effect of conservatism and the intensity of earnings covenants as the “contractual benefit” 
of conservatism. 
Column 4 juxtaposes the two effects of conservatism in one regression. As can be seen both 
informational and contractual effects remain significant in the presence of the other, which further 
highlights the importance of both channels through which conservatism can affect bond yields. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 confirm my second and third hypotheses. 
 
5.2.3 Overall effect of conservatism on bond spreads 
In the previous section, I documented the benefit as well as the cost of accounting 
conservatism for bond investors. Next, I investigate the overall effect of conservatism on bond 
spreads. Table 4 reports the results of testing H4a and H4b in which I directly regress bond yield 
spreads on the conservatism measure. As can be seen, the association between lagged conservatism 
and bond spreads is significantly positive (coefficient=0.031, p-value=0.006), indicating that the 
cost of reporting conservatively dominates its potential benefits for bond investors. In terms of 
economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in the level of conservatism results in 
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0.05% net increase in yield spreads in the subsequent quarter. Moreover, as column 2 shows, it 
appears that this cost is purely due to reporting lower values of earnings with an increase of 0.166% 
in yield spreads for firms with more loss quarters. While the coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term between conservatism and loss periods is significantly positive, the coefficient estimate on 
conservatism, which captures the effect of conservative reporting when reports reflect profits, is 
negative but insignificant. These results support my prediction that the overall adverse effect of 
conservatism on bond yield spreads results especially when reports reflect losses. This finding 
suggests that conservatism imposes net costs in the bond market due to the increase in uncertainty 
generated by the lower information content of bad news (Gigler et al. 2009).  
 
5.3 Cross-sectional tests 
To further confirm my findings that conservatism-induced uncertainty increases bond 
yields, I conduct a series of cross-sectional tests. First, I expect that bond investors of firms with 
better information environment will have more access to other sources of information and place 
less reliance on public accounting reports. Consequently, the negative impact of uncertainty due to 
conservatism should be attenuated leading to a lower demand for high interest rates. Conversely, 
when information environment of a firm is poor, the increased reliance of bond investors on public 
reports should lead to a higher demand for price protection against uncertainty. I test this conjecture, 
by sorting firms into terciles based on analyst following, analysts’ forecast dispersion, and firm 
size. I expect a lower association between bond yield spreads and conservatism-induced uncertainty 
for firms in the highest tercile of analyst following and firm size and the lowest tercile of analysts’ 
forecast dispersion. Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for these tests. As can be seen the effect 
of conservatism-induced uncertainty on bond yield spreads is significantly lower for firms with 
better information environment consistent with their lower sensitivity to the uncertainty induced by 
conservative public reports.  
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Second, due to their asymmetric payoff functions, I expect bondholders to be less 
concerned about the uncertainty induced by conservatism when their exposure to borrowers’ 
default risk is low. To test this prediction, I interact conservatism-induced uncertainty (InfoCost) 
with Ratings, and indicators for investment grade (InvGrade) and asset-backed (Asset_Backed) 
bonds. From Panel B of Table 5, the informational cost of conservatism has a significantly lower 
effect on bond interest rates for investment grade, higher rated, and asset-backed bonds. 
Overall, the cross-sectional results provide reassurance in relation to my main results by 
demonstrating that the effect of conservatism-induced uncertainty on bond yield spreads is lower 
in circumstances in which we expect bond investors to place less reliance on public disclosures. 
 
5.4 Secondary bond market tests 
To further analyze the informational impact of accounting conservatism on bond investors, 
I examine the secondary bond market. Focusing on the secondary market has the advantage that 
bond agreement terms such as covenants or stated yields are no longer any parties’ choice variables 
and the market sets bond yields-to-maturity entirely based on available information about bond 
issuers. Moreover, unlike for initial bond issuances, underwriters with access to private information 
do not play a role in the secondary market.  
Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) finds that, in the secondary (private) loan market, accounting 
conservatism reduces information asymmetry among investors as measured by bid-ask spreads. As 
discussed earlier, in contrast with private lenders, I hypothesize that accounting conservatism 
increases uncertainty among bond investors due to their lack of access to private information and 
other institutional differences. In the secondary market, I test this hypothesis by regressing bid-ask 
spreads on accounting conservatism and other controls using the empirical specification below: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑_𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗𝑡−1  
                          + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (8) 
33 
 
where i, j, and t are issue, firm, and time indices, respectively. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑟𝑑 is the bond credit rating 
for the trading quarter, 𝑇𝑚𝑡 is time-to-maturity, 𝑢𝑖 is the issue fixed effect, and the remaining 
variables are as defined earlier.  
 Table 6, Panel A, reports the descriptive statistics for traded bonds in the secondary bond 
market and their respective issuing firms. The average quarterly volume of trades is $125.63 million 
with the average bid-ask spread of 0.682 as a percentage of ask prices. Traded bonds have average 
(median) rating of BBB (BBB) with the remaining duration of 8.8 (6.1) years. Moreover, the 
average yield (to maturity) spread of traded bonds is 2.29% which is slightly more (less) than the 
yield spread of new bonds. Similar to firms that issue new bonds, firms with traded bonds on 
average report income conservatively and are large and profitable. 
 Table 6, Panel B, reports the results of the association between lagged conservatism and 
bid-ask spreads at both the bond issue level (columns 1 and 2) and the firm level (columns 3 and 
4). Consistent with my results for new bond issuances, I find that accounting conservatism is 
significantly positively associated with bid-ask spreads. Moreover, columns 2 and 4 show that this 
effect is exacerbated when borrowers report more losses in preceding periods.  
In Table 6, Panel C, I examine the impact of conservatism on bond yield spreads in the 
secondary market at both the issue level (columns 1 and 2) and the firm level (columns 3 and 4) 
using the following regression. 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 +
                          𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑇𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡           (9) 
where all control variables are similar to those in equation (8). Consistent with my results for new 
bond issuances, I find a positive and significant association between accounting conservatism and 
traded bond yields (coefficient estimate 0.043, p-value<0.001). Economically, a one standard 
deviation increase in the level of conservatism results in 0.07% increase in bond yield spreads in 
the subsequent quarter. Moreover, as column 2 suggests this cost is mainly attributable to reporting 
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low values of earnings with an increase of 0.293% in yield spreads for firms with more loss 
quarters. Columns 3 and 4 report qualitatively similar results at the firm level. 
I also conduct a changes analysis of bid-ask spreads and yield spreads in the secondary 
market. I replace all levels variables in equations (8) and (9) with one year changes. I report the 
results in Panel D of Table 6. Column 1 shows that the association between change in conservatism 
and change in bid-ask spreads is positive and significant. Moreover, as can be seen in column 2, 
conservatism significantly increases the bid-ask spread in the secondary market for firms with more 
accounting loss periods. Columns 3 and 4 report the effect of changes in conservatism on the yield 
spreads changes. I find that the change in conservatism has a significant positive association with 
changes in bond yields in the secondary market. Overall, the secondary bond market results mirror 
my prior findings in the new bonds sample and also help to alleviate endogeneity concerns inherent 
in tests of simultaneously determined variables. 
 
5.5 Robustness test: Alternative measures of conservatism 
In all previous tests, I use the skewness-based measure of conservatism following Givoly and Hayn 
(2000) and Beatty et al. (2008). I use this measure because it directly measures the reporting bias 
that IASB and FASB believe conservatism might induce and because it is consistent with the 
characterization of conservatism in Gigler et al. (2009). I further confirm my findings by using 
several alternative measures of conservatism. I use Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure 
and negative non-operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000, Ahmed and Duellman 2007, Beatty 
et al. 2008). To focus on the effect of conservative reporting of R&D expenditures, I also use the 
un-amortized portion of R&D expenses (Penman and Zhang 2002) as the third alternative measure 
of conservatism.   
I estimate the firm-level quarterly Basu measure of conservatism over a maximum of 20 
and minimum of 10 prior quarters using the Basu regression, 𝐸𝑡 𝑃𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝐸𝑡 𝑃𝑡−1⁄  is earnings per share scaled by closing price of prior quarter, 𝑅𝑡 is 
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quarterly cumulative return, and 𝐷𝑡 is the negative return indicator. I use the estimated 𝛽3 from this 
firm-specific regression as the asymmetric timeliness measure. Negative non-operating accruals is 
estimated following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Beatty et al. (2008) as -1 × ( Net Income + 
Depreciation Expense - Cash Flows from Operation - (ΔAccounts Receivable + ΔInventories + 
ΔPrepaid Expenses – ΔAccounts Payable - ΔTaxes Payable)) scaled by total assets and averaged 
over the past 20 quarters using a minimum of 5 past quarters when developing the average. The 
amount of R&D reserve is estimated as the unamortized portion of R&D assets generated by current 
and past R&D expenditures that would have been capitalized had accounting standards permitted 
their capitalization.  I amortize this expenditure using the sum-of-the-quarters’ digits method over 
20 quarters scaled by Net Operating Assets defined as (Total Assets + Long-Term Debt + Debt in 
Current Liabilities - Total Liabilities – Investments and Advances - Cash and Short-Term 
Investments) following Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2006). 
Table 7 presents the results of testing the effect of informational cost and contractual 
benefits of conservatism as well as the overall effect of conservatism on new bond yield spreads 
using these alternative measures. Conserv is the Basu’s Asymmetric timeliness measure in columns 
(1) and (2), non-operating accruals in columns (3) and (4), and unamortized R&D reserves in 
columns (5) and (6). As can be seen by the results presented in columns (1), (3), and (5), the 
informational cost of conservatism is significantly positive using alternative measures of 
conservatism, consistent with my previous finding in Table 3. However, the contractual benefit of 
conservatism, as captured by the coefficient on Conserv * NEarn_Cov, is insignificant, suggesting 
that the informational costs overshadow the contractual benefits of reporting conservatively for 
bond investors. Consistently, in columns (2), (4), and (6), I find that overall, reporting 
conservatively significantly increases the yield spreads of new bonds. In untabulated results, I also 
find that the overall negative effect of conservatism for bond investors is significantly higher when 
borrowers report more periods of accounting losses confirming my previous findings. 
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In another set of untabulated results, I also find that accounting conservatism, using alternative 
proxies, increases the uncertainty among bond investors. Moreover, this increase is mostly 
attributable to periods of losses, consistent with the results in Table 2. Lastly, I test the effect of 
conservatism on bond yield spreads in the secondary bond market using these alternative measure 
of conservatism. Untabulated results confirm my previous findings reported in Table 6 that 
conservatism increases yield spreads of bonds in the secondary market. Overall, the tenor of my 
results remains unchanged when alternative measures of conservatism are used, suggesting that the 
findings based on my primary measure of conservatism are not simply due to the choice of the 
proxy for accounting conservatism.   
 
6. Additional tests and Sensitivity Analysis 
6.1 Alternative measure of informational cost of conservatism 
Given the results in Table 2 that conservative reporting during loss periods increases uncertainty 
among bond investors, in Table 3, I defined the increased uncertainty due to the combined effect 
of conservatism and losses as the “informational cost” of conservative reporting in the bond market. 
As an alternative proxy for the informational cost of conservatism, in this subsection, I directly use 
the interaction between conservatism and loss periods to test H2 and H3. Specifically, I replace 
InfoCost in (3) with Conserv * Loss in the following regression model where all other variables 
and controls are as defined before: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1   
                     +𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡   
                     +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑀𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (10)
H2 predicts that the coefficient on Conserv * Loss (𝛽4) is significantly positive, and as before a 
negative coefficient on Conserv * NEarn_Cov (𝛽5) would confirm H3b. I include offering month 
and industry fixed effects to control for time trends and period- and industry-specific determinants 
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of bond yields. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are robust with respect to 
serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity of error terms. 
Results of testing equation (10) are presented in Table 8. Column 1 provides results of tests 
of H2 using the alternative proxy for informational cost of conservatism. The estimated coefficient 
on Conserv * Loss (𝛽4) is positive (0.174) and significant at the one percent level, confirming H2 
that conservative reporting imposes informational costs on bond investors who ex-ante price protect 
themselves by increasing interest rates. Column 2 reports results of testing H3b. As can be seen, 
the coefficient estimate on the interaction of conservatism and the intensity of earnings covenants 
(the contractual benefit proxy) is -0.025 (significant at 4% level) confirming that more intensity of 
earnings covenants coupled with conservative reporting benefits lenders by reducing bond interest 
rates. Finally, column 3 confirms that the contractual and the informational effects each remains 
significant in the presence of the other, similar to the finding in Table 3. Overall, the results in 
Table 9 reassure that the findings in Table 3 are not sensitive to the choice of proxy measure used 
for the informational cost of conservatism. 
 
6.2 Simultaneous effect of conservatism on bond yield and earnings covenant 
One key finding in Gigler et al. (2009) is that the optimal level of debt covenants is 
endogenously determined and varies with the degree of conservatism in accounting reports. They 
show that as the degree of accounting conservatism (both conditional and unconditional) increases, 
the optimal covenant threshold will move downward suggesting a substitution role of accounting 
conservatism with respect to debt covenants. To take into account the simultaneous determination 
of bond covenants intensity and yield spread with respect to the degree of conservatism, I 
simultaneously estimate the following system of equations which specifies bond yield spreads and 
the intensity of earnings covenants as a function of each other and the degree of reporting 
conservatism. I include quarter and industry fixed effects to control for time and industry specific 
invariant characteristics: 
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𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑞𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑗 +
                                 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                             (11) 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑞𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑗 +
                         𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                    (12)
The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 9. The correlation between the 
residuals of equations (11) and (12) is 0.077 and the Chi-Squared from the test of independence of 
these residuals is 47.942 which rejects the null hypothesis that this correlation is zero. As can be 
seen in the first column, the coefficient on yield spread is significantly negative. A one basis point 
increase in bond yield spread is associated with 0.059 reduction in the number of earnings-based 
bond covenants. Moreover, the coefficient on conservatism is negative, consistent with the 
prediction in Gigler et al. (2009) that conservatism and covenants are substitutes. However, this 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. Consistent with the results of testing H4a presented in Table 
4, in column (2), I find accounting conservatism significantly increases yield spread on new bonds 
after taking into account the simultaneous determination of covenants and yield spreads. In columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 9, I present the result of testing the system of equations in (11) and (12) 
augmented with the Loss and Conserv * Loss variables. Once again the independence of the 
seemingly unrelated equations in (11) is rejected (chi-squared=30.169). As one can see in column 
(4), accounting conservatism increases yield spreads significantly more when accounting reports 
convey bad news, reconfirming H4b and the results in Table 4. Overall, Table 9, reassures that 
findings in prior sections will remain unchanged after controlling for the joint endogenous 
determination of yield spreads and earnings covenants. 
 
6.3 Indirect measure of cost of public borrowing 
Using firm S&P long-term credit ratings as an indirect measure of cost of borrowing, 
Ahmed et al. (2002) document that accounting conservatism improves credit ratings and thus 
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reduces the cost of public borrowing. However, since the primary objective of these authors is to 
study the effect of conservative accounting in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over 
dividend policy, their sample consists of mostly dividend paying firms which are generally more 
profitable than an average firm. As reported in their paper, the sample mean ROA is 0.039 which 
is about four times more profitable than an average Compustat firm. As I illustrate later, this could 
potentially explain the difference in results between this paper and Ahmed et al. (2002).  
Moreover, prior literature highlights the circumstances in which credit agencies fail to 
incorporate all relevant information into their ratings (e.g., Grier and Katz 1976, Hettenhouse and 
Sartoris 1976, Pinches and Singleton 1978). For instance, credit ratings have been criticized for 
merely reflecting the probability of default without incorporating information about the extent of 
losses and recovery rates following defaults. Similarly, while a large proportion of firms’ bond 
spreads are explained by liquidity risk which is incremental to operating and leverage risks (e.g., 
Chen, Lesmond, and Wei 2007, Bao et al. 2011), existing literature and anecdotal evidence suggest 
that rating agencies may not adequately account for liquidity risk in their ratings (e.g., Schultz 2001, 
Gopalan, Song, Yerramilli 2014, Bao et al. 2011, Morris and Shin 2009). Moreover, because credit 
rating agencies favor the long-term measurement of creditworthiness (e.g., “through-the-cycle” 
rather than “point-in-time” approach), short-term fluctuations in the default risk such as business 
cycles may not trigger rating changes (Amato and Furfine 2004). Additionally, rating agencies and 
their published ratings are subject to other inefficiencies and frictions highlighted in prior literature 
such as ratings shopping (Skreta and Veldkamp 2009, Benmelech and Dlugosz 2009b, Cornaggia 
and Cornaggia 2013), catering and conflict of interest (e.g., Kisgen and Strahan 2010, Bolton, 
Freixas, and Shapiro 2012, Griffin, Nickerson, and Tang 2013), regulatory changes (Jorion, Liu, 
and Shi 2005, Cheng and Neamtiu 2009, Alp 2013, Dimitrov, Palia, and Tang 2015), inflation and 
deflation (Blume et al. 1998), Strobl and xia 2012, Alp 2013, Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo 2014) 
and stickiness and lack of timeliness (Altman and Rijken 2004, Fons et al. 2002, and Ellis 1998, 
Bonsall, Koharki, and Neamtiu 2015). Lastly, while S&P long-term ratings do not take into account 
40 
 
the provisions of a particular debt issue, interest rates incorporate all relevant information with 
regard to a specific issue as well as issuers in regards to meeting their obligations. For these reasons, 
I followed Zhang (2008) and used interest spreads as the direct measure of cost of borrowing instead 
of credit ratings in my main tests. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I repeat the test of my main 
Hypotheses in H4 using the S&P long-term credit rating as the dependent variable. I use ordered-
probit regression for these tests similar to Ahmed et al. (2002). Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. 
The results are presented in Table 10. In Column (1), the coefficient on Conserv is significantly 
negative at the 2% level, suggesting that higher levels of conservatism are associated with 
deteriorated credit rating in the subsequent quarter. This result is consistent with my prior results 
presented in Table 4 that overall conservatism increases cost of bond borrowing. Moreover, as can 
be seen in column (2), the coefficient on the Conserv * Loss is positive and significant (p-value < 
0.00). This result confirms my previous findings in Table 4 and is consistent with H4b. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on Conserv in Column (2) is positive and significant which suggests 
that conservatism during profit periods improves firms’ credit ratings. This finding together with 
the highly profitable sample of firms used in Ahmed et al. (2002) might explain their finding that 
conservative accounting reduces cost of public borrowing. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In their joint conceptual framework, the IASB and the FASB appear to downplay the 
benefits of conservatism as suggested by their statement that “The boards…no longer recognize 
accounting conservatism as a desirable quality of accounting” (FASB 2010 and IASB 2010). Yet, 
the majority of research studies document the benefits of conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 2006, 
Ahmed et al. 2002, Zhang 2008, Callen et al. 2015 LaFond and Watts 2008, Lara et al. 2011, 
Donovan et al. 2015 among others) and very few focus on the potential downside of reporting 
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conservatively (e.g., Gigler et al. 2009, Guay and Verrecchia 2006, Dyreng et al. 2017). Following 
Lambert’s (2010) suggestion that future research should investigate the underlying cost as well as 
benefit of accounting conservatism to pinpoint the optimal level of conservatism, I examine both 
the benefit and the potential cost of conservatism for bond market investors. 
My analysis is based on the premise that the relative costs and benefits of conservatism can 
vary among different stakeholders due to structural differences in their payoffs, information access, 
monitoring abilities, and renegotiation costs (Bharath et al. 2008, Li 2013, Armstrong et al. 2010, 
Nikolaev 2010). While prior studies have documented benefits of conservatism in private lending, 
I find conservatism to impose net costs in the bond market due to the increase in uncertainty 
generated by the lower information content of bad news (Gigler et al. 2009). While private lenders 
have greater access to managerial private information they rely less on public information and thus 
bear lower informational costs of conservatism. On the other hand, because private lenders rely 
more on covenants for monitoring borrowers, the benefits of conservatism are greater through the 
acceleration of covenant violations. In line with this reasoning, prior studies document the net 
benefit of conservatism for private lenders. In contrast, I show that costs outweigh the benefit of 
conservatism for bond investors, consistent with the contractual and informational environments 
bond investors face. My paper highlights that prior findings of the effect of conservative accounting 
need not generalize to all debtholders. Overall, my results together with prior findings underscore 
the incongruent demands for different accounting attributes by different financial statements users, 
leading regulators to make trade-off decisions that could affect different stakeholders differently. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (New Bond Issuances) 
  Mean Median Min Max Sd 
Yield Spread (%) 1.881 1.432 -2.553 7.854 1.566 
Offer_Amt (millions) 472.437 300 12.264 2500 445.65 
NEarn_Cov 0.386 0 0 2 0.786 
Ncov 6.763 6 0 22 3.821 
Maturity(Yrs) 11.35 9.942 1.932 40.636 8.716 
Rating BBB BBB+ D AAA - 
Size (billions) 26.379 6.586 0.082 250.278 49.594 
ROA (%) 0.958 0.936 -8.567 6.260 1.902 
Leverage 0.287 0.262 0.000 0.886 0.184 
BM 0.516 0.456 -0.407 1.871 0.367 
Conserv (Skewness) 0.670 0.504 -4.105 5.042 1.780 
Conserv (Basu Measure) 0.023 0.004 -0.722 0.953 0.217 
Conserv (Non op Accruals) 0.004 0.003 -0.017 0.040 0.008 
Conserv (Unamortized R&D) 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.136 0.020 
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Table 2 
The Effect of Conservatism and Low earnings on Bond Investors' Uncertainty 
 Bond-level  Firm-Level 
 Dependent Variable: Volatility of Bond Returns 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Conserv 0.011 0.005  0.010 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.145)  (0.022) (0.936) 
Loss  -0.156   -0.104 
  (0.009)   (0.206) 
Conserv * Loss  0.050   0.067 
  (0.001)   (0.026) 
ROA -0.021 -0.021  -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev 0.186 0.184  0.366 0.355 
 (0.013) (0.016)  (0.002) (0.003) 
Size 0.000 0.000  -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.180) (0.178)  (0.315) (0.301) 
BM 0.212 0.215  0.272 0.275 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
StockRet 0.000 0.000  0.002 0.002 
 (0.628) (0.707)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CFOVol 1.030 0.988  0.673 0.713 
 (0.101) (0.118)  (0.540) (0.521) 
Rating -0.052 -0.057  -0.052 -0.053 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 83,482 83,482  24,608 24,608 
R-squared 0.272 0.273  0.314 0.314 
Quarter FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Issue FE Yes Yes  No No 
Firm FE No No   Yes Yes 
Table 2 presents the estimates from the following regression:  
RetVolijt = β0 + β1 Conservjt−1 + β2 Lossjt−1 + β3 Conservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 + Controls + ui/j +
vt + εijt. 
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the quarterly volatility of bond returns.  In 
columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the (equally weighted) average volatility of 
returns over all traded bonds of the firm in a quarter. All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by issue in columns (1) and (2), and by issuer in 
columns (3) and (4) and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Informational Cost and Contractual Benefit of Conservatism 
 Dependent Variable: Bond Yield Spread 
 
Informational 
Cost 
 Contractual Benefit  
Cost & 
Benefit 
VARIABLES (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
InfoCost 0.475      0.464 
 (0.000)      (0.000) 
NEarn_Cov   -0.356  -0.340  -0.322 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Conserv     0.042  0.034 
     (0.001)  (0.014) 
Conserv * NEarn_Cov     -0.025  -0.025 
     (0.037)  (0.044) 
ROA -0.095  -0.126  -0.122  -0.091 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Lev 1.720  1.685  1.683  1.669 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BM 0.725  0.835  0.821  0.696 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Offer_Amt 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.295)  (0.261)  (0.261)  (0.326) 
Rating -0.063  -0.068  -0.068  -0.061 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Maturity 0.011  0.009  0.009  0.011 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Seniority -0.108  -0.062  -0.059  -0.102 
 (0.001)  (0.086)  (0.098)  (0.001) 
Ncov 0.064  0.124  0.125  0.096 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Asset_Backed -1.184  -0.595  -0.600  -1.133 
 (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.000) 
Redeemable 0.237  0.342  0.337  0.219 
 (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005) 
Observations 7,050  8,017  8,017  7,050 
R-squared 0.680  0.639  0.640  0.686 
Offering Month & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 3 presents the estimates from the following regression:  
Spreadijt = β0 + β1InfoCostjt−1 + β2NEarn_Cov𝑖𝑗𝑡 + β3 Conservjt−1 + β4Conservjt−1 ∗
NEarn_Cov𝑖𝑗𝑡 + Controls + Offer_Mnthi + Industryj + εijt.  
The dependent variable is Bond Yield Spreads in all columns. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are robust with respect to serial 
correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4 
The Overall Effect of Conservatism on Bond Yield Spreads 
 Dependent Variable 
  Bond Yield Spread 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Conserv 0.031 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.800) 
Loss  2.194 
  (0.000) 
Conserv * Loss  0.166 
  (0.007) 
ROA -0.123 -0.075 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev 1.750 1.140 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating -0.071 -0.059 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Offer_Amt 0.000 0.000 
 (0.235) (0.388) 
BM 0.854 0.788 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Maturity 0.009 0.011 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Seniority -0.064 -0.097 
 (0.088) (0.009) 
Ncov 0.093 0.082 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset_Backed -0.632 -0.476 
 (0.016) (0.071) 
Redeemable 0.349 0.289 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 8,017 8,017 
R-squared 0.634 0.667 
Offering Month & Industry FE Yes Yes 
Table 4 presents the estimates from the following regression: 
Spreadijt = β0 +  β1Conservjt−1 + β2Lossjt−1 + β3Conservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 + Controls +
Offer_Mnthi + Industryj + εijt.  
The dependent variable is Bond Yield Spreads in all columns. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are robust with 
respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Cross-Sectional Tests of the Effect of Conservatism-Induced Uncertainty on Yield Spreads 
Panel A: Borrowers' Information Environment     
 Dependent Variable: Bond Yield Spread 
 Information Environment Proxy: 
 
Analysts 
Following 
 
Analyst 
Forecast 
Dispersion 
 Size 
VARIABLES (1)   (2)   (3) 
InfoCost 0.502  0.459  0.550 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
InfoEnvrn_High 0.064  0.360  0.195 
 (0.666)  (0.008)  (0.064) 
InfoCost * InfoEnvrn_High -0.218  -0.288  -0.447 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Conserv 0.038  0.036  0.031 
 (0.007)  (0.026)  (0.014) 
NEarn_Cov -0.293  -0.304  -0.298 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Conserv * NEarn_Cov -0.022  -0.025  -0.018 
 (0.062)  (0.049)  (0.074) 
ROA -0.063  -0.059  -0.058 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Lev 1.865  1.977  1.681 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.005  -0.005  -0.004 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Offer_Amt 0.712  0.669  0.597 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rating 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.203)  (0.342)  (0.074) 
Seniority -0.056  -0.060  -0.052 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BM 0.012  0.012  0.013 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Maturity -0.103  -0.108  -0.114 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Ncov 0.087  0.088  0.080 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Asset_Backed -1.102  -1.027  -1.206 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Redeemable 0.211  0.218  0.247 
 (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.002) 
Observations 7,017  7,017  7,017 
R-squared 0.665  0.662  0.685 
Offering Month & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5 Panel A presents the estimates from the following regression: 
Spreadijt = β0 + β1InfoCostjt−1 + β2InfoEnvrn_Highjt−1 + β3InfoCostjt−1 ∗ InfoEnvrn_Highjt−1 +
Controls + Offer_Mnthi + Industryj + εijt.  
InfoEnvrn_High is an indicator variable that equals one if analyst following belongs to highest tercile in 
column (1), analyst forecast dispersion belongs to lowest tercile in column (2), and firm size belongs to 
highest tercile in column (3). The dependent variable is Bond Yield Spreads in all columns. All other 
variables are as defined in Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are robust with respect 
to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Cross-Sectional Tests of the Effect of Conservatism-Induced Uncertainty on Yield Spreads 
Panel B: Lenders’ Exposure to Default Risk      
 Dependent Variable: Bond Yield Spread 
 Default Risk Proxy: 
 
Rating  
Investment 
Grade 
 Asset 
Backed 
VARIABLES (1)   (2)   (3) 
InfoCost 1.009  0.807  0.571 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Default_Risk_Low 0.016  0.080  -0.649 
 (0.112)  (0.625)  (0.070) 
InfoCost * Default_Risk_Low -0.035  -0.375  -0.246 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.017) 
Conserv 0.024  0.024  0.024 
 (0.031)  (0.046)  (0.032) 
NEarn_Cov -0.295  -0.338  -0.416 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Conserv * NEarn_Cov -0.023  -0.023  -0.017 
 (0.052)  (0.066)  (0.210) 
ROA -0.066  -0.070  -0.084 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Lev 1.946  2.269  2.307 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.005  -0.006  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BM 0.632  0.703  0.674 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Offer_Amt 0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (0.212)  (0.795)  (0.557) 
Maturity 0.012  0.010  0.006 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Seniority -0.068  -0.095  -0.148 
 (0.073)  (0.033)  (0.001) 
Ncov 0.097  0.116  0.113 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Redeemable 0.108  0.131  0.270 
 (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.000) 
Observations 6,978  6,981  6,981 
R-squared 0.725  0.702  0.615 
Offering Month & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5 Panel B presents the estimates from the following regression:  
Spreadijt = β0 + β1InfoCostjt−1 + β2Default_Risk_Lowjt−1 + β3InfoCostjt−1 ∗ Default_Risk_Lowit−1 +
Controls + Offer_Mnthi + Industryj + εijt.  
In column (1), Default_Risk_Low equals bond ratings as defined in Appendix II. In column (2), 
Default_Risk_Low is an indicator variable that equals one if the bond is rated BBB- or better. In column (3), 
Default_Risk_Low is an indicator variable that equals one if the bond is asset-backed. The dependent variable 
is Bond Yield Spreads in all columns. All other variables are as defined in Appendix II. Standard errors are 
clustered by industry and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. 
Clustered robust P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
Secondary Bond Market 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics     
  Mean Median Min Max Sd 
Quarterly Trade Volume (millions) 125.639 60.518 0.508 1143.296 187.039 
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 0.682 0.504 0.026 3.347 0.601 
Yield Spread (%) 2.289 -0.127 1.527 14.698 2.412 
Time-to-Maturity (Yrs) 8.805 6.131 0.128 29.889 8.245 
Rating (at Trade Quarters) BBB BBB D AAA - 
Size (billions) 35.410 14.357 0.218 250.318 52.825 
ROA (%) 1.032 1.030 -8.382 5.768 1.807 
Leverage 0.283 0.260 0.022 0.794 0.160 
BM 0.548 0.454 -0.364 2.464 0.439 
Conserv (Skewness Measure) 0.689 0.573 -4.289 4.851 1.762 
Conserv (Basu Measure) 0.037 0.008 -0.560 0.830 0.197 
Conserv (Non op Accruals) 0.005 0.003 -0.017 0.039 0.008 
Conserv (Unamortized R&D) 0.005 0 0 0.103 0.015 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Secondary Bond Market 
Panel B: The Effect of Conservatism on  Bid-Ask Spreads (levels) 
 Bond-level  Firm-Level 
 Dependent Variable: Bid-Ask Spread 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Conserv 0.007 0.000  0.009 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.835)  (0.006) (0.180) 
Loss  0.108   0.041 
  (0.011)   (0.002) 
Conserv * Loss  0.033   0.025 
  (0.001)   (0.000) 
ROA -0.010 -0.009  -0.014 -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.014) 
Lev 0.526 0.502  0.513 0.506 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.135 0.137  0.186 0.180 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
StockRet 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CFOVol 1.463 1.261  1.199 1.167 
 (0.020) (0.046)  (0.127) (0.139) 
Rating -0.023 -0.018  -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 106,098 106,098  29,407 29,407 
R-squared 0.265 0.266  0.270 0.273 
Quarter FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Issue FE Yes Yes  No No 
Firm FE No No   Yes Yes 
Table 6 Panel B presents the estimates from the following regression:  
Bid_Askijt = β0 + β1  Conservjt−1 +  β2Conservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 + β3Lossjt−1 + Controls + ui/j +
vt + εijt.  
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the quarterly bond bid-ask spread.  In columns 
(3) and (4), the dependent variable is the (equally weighted) average bid-ask spread over all 
traded bonds of the firm in a quarter. All other variables are as defined in Appendix II. Standard 
errors are clustered by issue in Columns (1) and (2), and by issuer in columns (3) and (4) and are 
robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust 
P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Secondary Bond Market 
Panel C: The Effect of Conservatism on Yield Spreads (levels) 
 Bond-level  Firm-Level 
 Dependent Variable: Bond Yield Spread 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Conserv 0.043 -0.008  0.065 0.043 
 (0.000) (0.307)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss  0.901   0.208 
  (0.000)   (0.001) 
Conserv * Loss  0.293   0.125 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
ROA -0.109 -0.102  -0.138 -0.099 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev 2.982 2.795  3.838 3.801 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 1.481 1.492  1.590 1.558 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating  -0.446 -0.398  -0.449 -0.443 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tmt -0.044 -0.042  - - 
 (0.300) (0.280)    
Observations 111,242 111,242  31,508 31,508 
R-squared 0.587 0.590  0.598 0.600 
Quarter FE Yes Yes  29,407 Yes 
Issue FE Yes Yes  0.270 No 
Firm FE No No  Yes Yes 
Table 6 Panel C presents the estimates from the following regression:  
Spreadijt = β0 + β1  Conservjt−1 +  β2Conservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 + β3Lossjt−1 + Controls +
ui/j + vt + εijt.  
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the quarterly bond yield spreads.  In 
columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the (equally weighted) average yield spreads 
over all traded bonds of the firm in a quarter. All other variables are as defined in Appendix 
II. Standard errors are clustered by issue in columns (1) and (2), and by issuer in columns 
(3) and (4) and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Secondary Bond Market 
Panel D: The Effect of Conservatism on Bid-Ask and Yield Spreads (Change Specification) 
 Dependent Variable 
 ΔBid-Ask Spread  ΔYield Spread 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
ΔConserv 0.008 0.001  0.040 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.883)  (0.019) (0.326) 
Loss  0.101   0.745 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
ΔConserv * Loss  0.023   0.135 
  (0.043)   (0.061) 
ΔROA -0.021 -0.018  -0.163 -0.142 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔLev 0.594 0.522  4.589 4.065 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔSize -0.005 -0.005  0.004 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.164) (0.088) 
ΔBM 0.279 0.283  2.657 2.689 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔRating  -0.018 -0.012  -0.390 -0.342 
 (0.010) (0.108)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔTmt -0.046 -0.060  18.14 18.10 
 (0.924) (0.901)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 91,417 91,417  89,679 89,679 
R-squared 0.076 0.076  0.220 0.225 
Year & Issue FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Table 6 Panel D presents the estimates from the following regression:  
Dep_Varijt = β0 +  β1ΔConservjt−1 + β2Lossjt−1 + β3ΔConservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 + Controls + ui + vt + εijt.  
The dependent variable is one year change in bid-ask spreads (𝛥𝐵𝑖𝑑_𝐴𝑠𝑘) in columns (1) and (2) and 
change in bond yield spreads (ΔSpread) in columns (3) and (4). Loss is an indicator which equals 1 if 
earnings before extraordinary items are negative during the 4 quarters. All other variables are as defined 
in Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by issue and are robust with respect to serial correlation and 
cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Conservatism Measures 
 Dependent Variable: Bond Yield Spread 
 Conservatism Measure: 
 
Basu’s Asym. 
Timeliness 
 Non-Operating 
Accruals 
 Unamortized R&D 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
InfoCost 0.406   0.415   0.466  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
NEarn_Cov -0.378   -0.304   -0.330  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Conserv * NEarn_Cov 0.143   1.602   0.683  
 (0.428)   (0.606)   (0.462)  
Conserv 0.099 0.292  4.993 9.735  1.561 3.907 
 (0.391) (0.002)  (0.143) (0.013)  (0.401) (0.076) 
ROA -0.079 -0.104  -0.071 -0.099  -0.087 -0.101 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev 2.084 2.502  2.061 2.232  1.988 2.273 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating -0.003 -0.004  -0.060 -0.073  -0.003 -0.073 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.645 0.799  -0.005 -0.004  -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Offer_Amt -0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.778) (0.889)  (0.378) (0.955)  (0.928) (0.594) 
BM -0.068 -0.079  0.714 0.791  0.635 0.838 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Maturity 0.009 0.007  0.012 0.008  0.011 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Seniority -0.080 -0.070  -0.109 -0.090  -0.086 -0.093 
 (0.048) (0.122)  (0.000) (0.060)  (0.029) (0.061) 
Ncov 0.071 0.079  0.090 0.094  0.104 0.098 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset_Backed -0.965 -0.913  -0.993 -0.599  -0.880 -0.577 
 (0.000) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.010)  (0.000) (0.010) 
Redeemable 0.189 0.347  0.224 0.366  0.184 0.328 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) 
Observations 6,389 6,825  7,011 7,939  6,896 7,863 
R-squared 0.681 0.626  0.694 0.615  0.651 0.595 
Offering Month & Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Table 7 presents the estimates from the following regressions in columns (1) and (2) respectively: 
Spreadijt = β0 + β1InfoCostjt−1 + β2NEarn_Covijt + β3 Conservjt−1 + β4Conservjt−1 ∗ NEarn_Covijt + Controls +
Offer_Mnthi + Industryj + εijt, 
Spreadijt = β0 +  β1Conservjt−1 + Controls + Offer_Mnthi + Industryj + εijt.  
The dependent variable is Bond Yield Spreads in all columns. Conserv is Basu’s asymmetric timeliness measure 
in columns (1) and (2), non-operating accruals in columns (3) and (4), and the unamortized R&D expenditures in 
columns (5) and (6). All other variables are as defined in Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by industry 
and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-values 
are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8 
Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Measure of Informational Cost of Conservatism 
 Dependent Variable: Bond Yield Spread 
 
Informational 
Cost 
 Contractual 
Benefit 
 Cost & 
Benefit 
VARIABLES (1)   (2)   (3) 
Conserv -0.003  0.041  0.009 
 (0.817)  (0.002)  (0.453) 
Loss 2.055    2.066 
 (0.000)    (0.000) 
Conserv * Loss 0.174    0.142 
 (0.014)    (0.034) 
NEarn_Cov   -0.313  -0.235 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Conserv * NEarn_Cov  
 -0.025  -0.023 
 
 
 (0.041)  (0.087) 
Loss * NEarn_Cov  
 
 
 -0.181 
 
 
 
 
 (0.281) 
Conserv * Loss * NEarn_Cov  
 
 
 0.050 
 
 
 
 
 (0.374) 
ROA -0.047  -0.090  -0.047 
 (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
Lev 1.569  2.106  1.514 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.005  -0.006  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BM 0.819  0.858  0.803 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Offer_Amt 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.414)  (0.322)  (0.418) 
Rating -0.057  -0.066  -0.056 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Maturity 0.012  0.010  0.012 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Seniority -0.104  -0.069  -0.099 
 (0.008)  (0.073)  (0.011) 
Ncov 0.079  0.118  0.103 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Asset_Backed -0.493  -0.610  -0.470 
 (0.078)  (0.021)  (0.086) 
Redeemable 0.275  0.318  0.265 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 7,981  7,981  7,981 
R-squared 0.64  0.62  0.65 
Offering Month & Industry FE Yes   Yes   Yes 
Table 8 presents the estimates from the following regression:   
Spreadijt = β0 +  β1Conservjt−1 + β2NEarn_Cov𝑖𝑗𝑡 + β3Lossjt−1 + β4Conservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 +
β5Conservjt−1 ∗ NEarn_Cov𝑖𝑗𝑡 + β6Conservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 ∗ NEarn_Cov𝑖𝑗𝑡 + Controls +
Offer_Mnth𝑖𝑗 + Industryi + εijt  
The dependent variable is Bond Yield Spreads in all columns. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are robust with respect with respect to 
serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered robust P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 9  
Conservatism and Simultaneous determination of Bond Yield and Earnings Covenants 
 Dependent Variable: 
 NEarn_Cov Yield Spread 
 NEarn_Cov Yield Spread 
VARIABLES (1)   (2) 
Yield Spread -0.059  
 -0.049  
 (0.000)  
 (0.000)  
NEarn_Cov  -0.401   -0.303 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Conserv -0.000 0.027  0.002 -0.0101 
 (0.958) (0.000) 
 (0.432) (0.147) 
Loss    -0.044 2.076 
    (0.193) (0.000) 
Conserv * Loss    -0.019 0.208 
    (0.181) (0.000) 
ROA -0.006 -0.098  -0.007 -0.048 
 (0.020 ) (0.000) 
 (0.015) (0.000) 
Lev 0.091 2.308  0.083 1.712 
 (0.015) (0.000) 
 (0.026) (0.000) 
Size -0.001 -0.004  -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
BM -0.015 0.755  -0.021 0.694 
 (0.367) (0.000) 
 (0.207) (0.000) 
Offer_Amt 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.691) (0.124) 
 (0.665) (0.477) 
Rating 0.002 -0.072  0.002 -0.060 
 (0.043) (0.000) 
 (0.016) (0.000) 
Maturity -0.001 0.007  -0.001 0.008 
 (0.360) (0.000) 
 (0.268) (0.000) 
Seniority 0.001 -0.090  -0.002 -0.111 
 (0.940) (0.002) 
 (0.845) (0.000) 
Asset_Backed -0.081 -0.753  -0.076 -0.672 
 (0.278) (0.000) 
 (0.311) (0.000) 
Redeemable 0.065 0.418  0.063 0.345 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 7,942 7,942  7,942 7,942 
R-squared 0.76 0.56  0.76 0.60 
Offering Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Breusch-Pegan Chi-Squared 47.942   30.169 
Table 9 presents the estimates from the following seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model: 
NEarn_Covijt = α0 + α1Spreadijt + α2 Conservjt−1 + Controls + Offer_qtrij + Industryi + εijt   
Spreadijt = β0 + β1NEarn_Cov𝑖𝑗𝑡 + β2 Conservjt−1 + Controls + Offer_qtrij + Industryi + εijt.  
The dependent variable is Bond Yield Spreads in all columns. Conserv is the skewness measure of 
conservatism as defined earlier. All variables are as defined in Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered 
by industry and are robust with respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. 
Clustered robust P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 10  
The Effect of Conservatism on Firm Credit Ratings 
 Dependent Variable: 
  Firm Credit Rating 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Conserv -0.014 0.035 
 (0.029) (0.000) 
Loss  -2.572 
  (0.000) 
Conserv * Loss  -0.136 
  (0.000) 
ROA 0.058 0.016 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev -2.826 -2.207 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.044 0.0433 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
BM -0.321 -0.318 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
StockRet -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CFOVol -7.182 -5.585 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 104,526 104,526 
Pseudo R-squared 0.117 0.162 
Table 10 presents the estimates from the following ordered-probit regressions: 
Ratingijt = β0 +  β1Conservjt−1 + β2Lossjt−1 + β3Conservjt−1 ∗ Lossjt−1 +
Controls + εijt.  
The dependent variable is S&P long-term credit rating in all columns. Conserv is 
the skewness measure of conservatism as defined earlier. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix II. Standard errors are clustered by firm and are robust with 
respect to serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustered 
robust P-values are reported in parentheses 
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Appendix I: Analytical Model 
Following Gigler and Hemmer (2001) and Gigler et al. (2009), consider a binary setting in 
which a firm’s future cash flows could be either low ( ) with probability  or high ( ) with 
probability  where  is the exogenous prior and a common knowledge. At an interim date, 
a conservative accounting system generates a report that could be either high or low ( , ) based 
on news about future cash flows and the degree of accounting conservatism. The conservative 
accounting system reports bad news immediately with probability one, but requires a higher 
verifiability threshold to disclose good news. For simplicity, assume that low values of cash flows 
are always reported as low (with probability one) but high values of cash flows are reported as high 
only with probability ( ) which captures the notion of higher verifiability requirement for good 
news.31 As such a high cash flow ( ) can be reported as a low signal ( ) with probability (
. This accounting system is represented in Figure (1). 
A1.1 Bond 
Now consider a representative firm which raises one unit of currency by issuing a bond 
that pays  if the firm generates high cash flow ( ) at maturity. However, if  is realized, 
firm’s resources are not enough to repay either the promised interest or the principal of the bond, 
i.e., . Additionally, the bond contains a covenant which transfers control rights 
to investors based on the realization of the interim signal that the accounting system generates 
which will be described below. 
A1.2 Interim Signal 
The accounting system which is characterized above generates an interim signal after the 
bond is issued and before the bond maturity. This signal is informative about the future cash flows 
                                                          
31 In the continuous setting in Gigler et al. (2009), higher verifiability requirement for good news results in 
stochastic downward shift in earnings reports. 
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of the firm. A bond covenant is written on this interim signal which transfers control rights to the 
bondholder in the case that the interim signal reflects firm’s weak performance (i.e. ). When  
is realized, the bondholder decide whether to continue the firm until the terminal date and receive 
either or  or to liquidate the firm at an interim date for a liquidation value of . Further, 
assume that the liquidation is efficient if the true cash flow is  but is inefficient if the true level 
of cash flow is ; i.e. assume . The bondholder’s decision tree and 
contingent payoffs are presented in Figure (2). Given the information structure of this model the 
following posterior probabilities could be derived: 
, 
, 
, 
, 
. 
Using these probabilities, the payoffs to bondholder’s decision after observing the interim 
signal can be obtained. When the interim signal is , the bondholder will choose to continue the 
firm only if the expected payoff from the continuation exceeds the immediate liquidation value : 
xH
yH
yL
xL yL
Figure (1): The structure of accounting system 
1-p 
p 
1 
1-λ 
λ 
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. 
By Substituting  and rearranging the above condition, one can obtains that if 
, the bondholder will prefer to let the borrower continue when a low interim 
signal is realized. The intuition is that, for a high degree of conservatism ( , the low interim signal 
𝑌𝐿 has a high chance of being drawn from a high cash flow value because  is increasing 
in . Therefore, the expected payoff from continuation exceeds the liquidation value even though 
the interim signal shows weak performance.  
The expected payoff in this case will be equal to  This 
expression shows that if the level of conservatism is too high, the uncertainty about the true state 
of cash flow when  is reported increases to the extent that the investor will ignore the interim 
signal and will not base her interim decision on the accounting signal, hence, she will always 
continue the project. 
 On the other hand, when  the bondholder will prefer to exercise her 
contractual rights and liquidate the firm when 𝑌𝐿 is reported. In this case, her payoff given is 
observed is simply . Consequently, investors expected payoff at time 0, will be different under 
two conservatism regimes; If  
Figure (2): The Bondholder’s payoff structure 
Invest 1 unit in 
bond
yH
continue
XH
𝜑 𝑋𝐻 , 𝑌𝐻 = 𝑅
yL
continue
XH
𝜑 𝑋𝐻 , 𝑌𝐿 = 𝑅
XL
𝜑 𝑋𝐿 , 𝑌𝐿 = 𝑋𝐿Liquidiate
𝜑 Liquidate = 𝑀
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and if  
. 
Replacing , , and  in the above equations results in 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 When  , the bondholder will always continue the project and her 
expected payoff at t=0 is . When , the 
bondholder will liquidate the firm when is observed and continue the project when  is 
observed. Her expected payoff at t=0 will be 
. 
As one can readily see, the expected payoff to the bond is strictly increasing in  when 
 and insensitive to changes in  when  which leads to the following corollary: 
Corollary 1 The Expected payoff to a bond is weakly decreasing in the degree of conservatism ( ). 
Specifically: 
 and  . 
The result in proposition 1 and corollary 1 should not be surprising. Rewriting 
bondholder’s expected payoff when , one can obtain: 
.  
The term in the first bracket on the right hand side of the above equation is simply the expected 
payoff had the interim signal been fully informative; that is, when ,  is reported as  
and   is reported as with probability one. So, there will be no ambiguity about the level of 
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cash flows specifically when the low signal ( ) is observed. However, when , uncertainty 
about the cash flow from which is drawn arises. In this case, with probability 
 the low signal is drawn from 𝑋𝐻 state, yet the firm will be 
inefficiently liquidated. Therefore, the bondholder receives  at the interim date instead of 
a potential  at the maturity. The second bracket on the left hand side of the above expression, 
represents this inefficiency. 
It should be obvious that any decrease in the expected payoff of a bond will result in a 
higher interest rate. The simplest way to illustrate this point, is to assume that there exists a risk 
free asset in the market which will pay  at the terminal date for every dollar invested at time 0. 
In expectation, the payoff of all assets in the economy must be equal to the risk free rate at time 0, 
i.e.,   Conditioning this relationship on different values of , I can write: 
If , and if  
.  
Rearranging the above expressions will lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2 The relationship between bond interest rates and conservatism will be a piecewise 
function described below: 
 (A): The Bond expected payoff                                                    (B): Bond Interest rate 
Figure (3): The Bond expected payoff (A) and Interest rate (B) as a function of conservatism Level 
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If , . 
If  ,  . 
Once again, the following corollary is readily obtained. 
Corollary 2 The bond interest rate is weakly increasing in the degree of conservatism ( ). 
Specifically: 
 . 
Figure 3 summarizes the results obtained in corollary 2. 
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Appendix II: Variables Definitions 
Variable   Definition 
Anlst_Disp = Indicator variable that equals 1 if the average analyst dispersion during 
the past 5 to 20 quarters used in measuring conservatism belongs to the 
lowest tercile. 
Anlst_No = Indicator variable that equals 1 if the average number of analysts during 
the past 5 to 20 quarters used in measuring conservatism belongs to the 
highest tercile. 
Asset_Backed = Indicator variable that equals 1 if the issue is asset backed. 
BM = Total common equity divided by market value of equity. 
Bid-Ask = Quarterly bid-ask spread of traded bonds. 
CFO = Operating cash flows. 
Conserv (Skewness) = Difference between the skewness of operating cash flows (deflated by 
total assets) and earnings before extraordinary items (deflated by total 
assets) using a maximum of 20 and a minimum of 5 prior quarters.  
Conserv (Basu)  Basu measure of asymmetric timeliness estimated from a time-series 
regression of the Basu model using a minimum of 10 and maximum of 
20 quarters data. 
Conserv (Non Op 
Accruals) 
= Negative non-Operating accruals measure of conservatism defined as-1 
× (Net Income + Depreciation Expense - Cash Flows from Operations - 
(ΔAccounts Receivable + ΔInventories + ΔPrepaid Expenses – 
ΔAccounts Payable - ΔTaxes Payable))/Total Assets averaged over the 
past 20 quarters using minimum of 5 quarters. 
Conserv (Unamortized 
R&D) 
= Unamortized portion of R&D assets generated by current and past R&D 
expenditures, using the sum-of-the-quarters’ digits method over 20 
quarters, scaled by Net Operating Assets defined as (Total Assets + 
Long-Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities - Total Liabilities – 
Investments and Advances - Cash and Short-Term Investments). 
NEarn_Cov = Earnings covenant intensity defined as the sum of 
fixed_charge_coverage_is, fixed_charge_coverage_sub, 
net_earnings_test_issuance covenants on FISD file. 
InvGrade = Indicator variable that equals 1 if the bond issue is rated BBB- or better. 
Lev = Total long-term liabilities deflated by total assets. 
Loss = The proportion of periods with negative reported income before 
extraordinary items over the same quarters that is used to measure 
conservatism. 
Maturity = Initial duration of bonds (years). 
Ncov = Total number of covenants included in a bond contract. 
Offer_Amt = Bond offering size (millions USD). 
Rating  = (=Rating_Issue) S&P bond rating at issuance coded from 1 to 22 where 
highest numbers represent better ratings. If S&P rating is not available, 
I use Moody's or Fitch ratings.  
Rating_Trd = In bond-level regressions, I use S&P issue-specific bond ratings at the 
transaction quarter, which is replaced with Moody's or Fitch ratings if 
S&P ratings are unavailable. In firm-level regressions, I use S&P firms’ 
long-term debt credit ratings in the transaction quarter. If missing, it is 
replaced with the imputed rating from the regression of 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
 ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑅𝑂𝐴 + ?̂?2𝐿𝑒𝑣 + ?̂?3𝐵2𝑀 + ?̂?4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + ?̂?5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + ?̂?6𝐷𝑖𝑣 where 
coefficients are estimated for available data and used to predict missing 
ratings. Loss is the negative earnings indicator for the quarter and Div is 
an indicator for quarters with dividend payments. Other variables are as 
defined in this table. The variable is coded similar to Rating. 
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Appendix II: Variables Definitions (Continued) 
Redeemable = Indicator variable that equals 1 if the issue is redeemable. 
ROA = Net income as a percentage of total assets. 
Seniority = Seniority level of issued bond coded from 1 (junior subordinate) to 7 (secured 
senior). 
Size = Market value of equity (billions USD) 
Spread = Bond yield spreads defined as the offering yield (or yield to maturity in 
secondary market tests) subtracted by the yield of treasury security offered 
during the same month with closest maturity date to that of the bond. 
StockRet = Raw cumulative quarterly stock returns. 
Tmt = Remaining life of a bond (years). 
CFOVol = Standard deviation of operating cash flows deflated by total assets calculated 
over the same prior 5 to 20 quarters over which Conservatism is measured. 
RetVol = Quarterly standard deviation of bond returns calculated form daily bond returns. 
In firm-level regressions, this variable represents equally weighted average of 
the standard deviation of all bonds of the firm. 
InfoCost = The volatility of returns explained by Conserv interacted with Loss 
i.e., 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝑗1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡 + ?̂?𝑗2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡 + ?̂?𝑗3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡 where 
parameters are estimated from 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑡−1 +
 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡−1 +
𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝐵2𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝑉𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 +
𝛼11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 . 
 
